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 chapter 10
Distinguishing between Use and Abuse of EU Free 
Movement Law: Evaluating Use of the “Europe- route” 




The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 marked “a new stage in the process of creating 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.1 Before 1992, European 
integration was built upon economic premises, which translated into the 
four fundamental freedoms of goods, persons, services and capital.2 Rights 
that were given to individuals were aimed at realizing the economic goals 
that were part of the eec’s design.3 The right to family reunification for 
workers, for instance, was granted to facilitate their integration into the host 
 * PhD Researcher, Ghent European Law Institute of Ghent University (Jean Monnet Centre of 
Excellence). The author is grateful to Dimitry Kochenov, Alina Tryfonidou, Peter Van Elsu-
wege, and Michaela McCown for their comments on earlier versions of this contribution.
 1 Art. A  of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). It is debated whether 
the Maastricht promise has realized its full potential. See e.g. Kochenov, D., and Plender, 
R. (2012). EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? European Law 
Review 37, pp. 369– 396.
 2 Now Arts 30, 34, 45, 49, 56 and 63 tfeu. Barnard, C.  (2013). The Substantive Law of the 
EU:  The Four Freedoms. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Despite its economic premises, 
the European Economic Community (eec) was a political project that was meant to fur-
ther peace and welfare after the Second World War. An economic approach was chosen, 
however, because political integration was not feasible, and the original plan to establish a 
European Political Community and/ or a European Defence Community was rejected by the 
French Parliament. Koopmans, R., and Statham, P., eds. (2010). The Making of a European 
Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 16 et seq.
 3 First the eec, later the Economic Community (EC), and now the European Union. Try-
fonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, p. 5 et seq.; Croon- Gestefeld, J. (2017). Reconceptualising European Equality Law: A 











Hester Kroeze - 9789004433076
Downloaded from Brill.com01/16/2021 01:42:07PM
via free access
Distinguishing between Use and Abuse of EU Free Movement Law 223
Member State and to further the economic purpose of their movement.4 
Therefore, it was only available to those who move to or reside in a Member 
State of which they are not a national.5 The Maastricht Treaty broadened the 
sphere of European cooperation by establishing the EU, and introduced EU 
citizenship.6
This contribution departs from the premise that one of the qualities that 
citizenship confers is equality before the law.7 It is shown, however, that equal-
ity before the law collides with another constitutional principle of EU law. The 
principle of conferral implies that some competences are conferred to the EU 
and others are retained by the Member States.8 As a result, the legal position 
of citizens differs, depending on whether they are subject to national or Euro-
pean rules. This differentiation may cause inequality.9
Because of its unique position at the intersection of free movement, immi-
gration policy, fundamental rights, limited Union competence, and political 
controversy, familly reunification is one of the areas in which differentation 
between citizens occurs on the basis of whether they are a subject to EU law or 
 4 Berneri, C.  (2017). Family Reunification in the EU:  The Movement and Residence Rights of 
Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 8; 
Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., Lodder, G., and Wouters, K. (2014). European Migration Law. Cam-
bridge: Intersentia, p. 30.
 5 Now: Art. 3 of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 and 
repealing Directives 64/ 221/ EEC, 68/ 360/ EEC, 72/ 194/ EEC, 73/ 148/ EEC, 75/ 34/ EEC, 75/ 35/ 
EEC, 90/ 364/ EEC, 90/ 365/ EEC and 93/ 96/ EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77– 123.
 6 Among other institutional changes, such as the introduction of new policy areas by the 
Maastricht Treaty.
 7 Kochenov, D.  (2010). Citizenship Without Respect:  The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal. Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 8, p. 12 et seq.; Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citi-
zenship as a Federal Denominator. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role 
of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5, 9; De Búrca, G. (1997). The Role of 
Equality in European Community Law. In: Dashwood and O’Leary, eds., The Principle of Equal 
Treatment in EC Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 16; Marshall, T.H. (1992). Citizenship and 
Social Class. London: Pluto Press.
 8 Art. 4, para. 1, and Art. 5, paras 1– 2, teu and Arts 2– 6 tfeu.
 9 Garben, S., and Govaere, I.  (2017). The Division of Competences Between the EU and the 
Member States Reflections on the Past, the Present and the Future. In: Garben and Govaere, 
eds., The Division of Competences Between the EU and the Member States Reflections on the 
Past, the Present and the Future. Oxford: Hart, p. 3 et seq.; Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Dis-
crimination in EC Law, cit., p. 6; Also see the contribution of H.U. Jessurun D’Oliveira in this 
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not.10 Family reunification in the EU is defined as the situation in which a third- 
country national family member of a resident of one of the Member States ac-
quires a residence title to reside with the family member who is already legally 
in the EU.11 The family member in the EU can either be a third- country na-
tional or an EU citizen. This contribution only examines family reunification 
between third- country nationals and EU citizens. The legal regime for family 
reunification between third- country nationals who are legally residing in the 
EU and their third- country national family members is not discussed.12
Directive 2004/ 38 regulates the right of EU citizens and their family mem-
bers to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. EU 
citizens who move to or reside in a Member State of which they are not a na-
tional benefit from its protection, which includes the possibility for family 
reunification under very lenient conditions.13 Family reunification between 
third- country nationals and EU citizens who do not move to or reside in a 
Member State of which they are not a national is regulated by the Member 
State of which the EU citizens is a national. Some Member States impose re-
quirements for family reunification for their own nationals that are far stricter 
than the requirements EU law imposes on EU citizens who exercise their free 
movements rights.14 This phenomenon is called reverse discrimination.15
 10 Faull, J. (2011). Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law. In: De La 
Feria, and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. A New General Principle of EU Law? 
Oxford: Hart, p. 291 et seq., especially p. 293.
 11 The term “third- country national” refers to anyone who does not have the nationality of 
one of the Member States.
 12 Third- country national residents in the EU can rely on Directive 2003/ 86/ EC of the 
Council of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, 
p. 12– 18.
 13 When an EU citizen resides in a Member State in compliance with Directive 2004/ 38, his 
family members can join him without the need to fulfill any conditions, except for the 
obligation to have health insurance. See Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.
 14 See Neergaard, U., Jacqueson, C., and Holst- Christensen, N., eds. (2014). Union 
Citizenship: Development Impact and Challenges. The xxvi fide Congress in Copenhagen. 
Copenhagen:  djøf Publishing, available at fide2014.eu; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse 
Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 120 et seq.; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the 
European Union: A Recurring Balancing Act. Cambridge: Intersentia, p. 4 et seq., 39 et seq.; 
Berneri, C. (2017). Family Reunification in the EU, cit., p. 7.
 15 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 13 et seq., p. 117 et seq.; Verbist, 
V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 3 et seq.; Davies, G. (2003). 
Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International; Poiares Maduro, M.  (2000). The Scope of European Remedies:  The 
Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination. In:  Kilpatrick, Novitz, 
and Skidmore, eds., The Future of European Remedies. London: Bloomsbury Publishing; 
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When a national of a Member State cannot comply with the strict condi-
tions for family reunification in national law, EU law allows to benefit from 
more lenient rules by moving to another Member State, after which EU law is 
applicable. Case- law of the Court of Justice provides that upon return to the 
home Member State of the EU citizen (in a return situation), his family mem-
bers retain their residence rights. The only condition to retain these rights is 
that residence in the host Member State must have been genuine. If that is 
the case, the family continues to fall within the scope of EU law and does not 
need to comply with the conditions for family reunification that are posed by 
the national law of that Member State.16 If the conditions are fulfilled, this 
Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights. European Journal of Migration and Law 
13 (4), pp.  443– 466; Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal 
Situations:  An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
35 (1), pp.  43– 67; Hanf, D.  (2011). Reverse Discrimination in EU Law:  Constitutional 
Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice? Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 18 (1– 2), pp.  29– 61; Oosterom- Staples, H.  (2012). To What Extent 
Has Reverse Discrimination Been Reversed? European Journal of Migration and Law 14 
(2), pp.  151– 172; Groenendijk, K.  (2014). Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification 
and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin. In: Guild, Rotaeche, and Kostakopoulou, eds., 
The Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship. Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers; O’Leary, S. (2009). The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in 
EU Law. Irish Jurist 44, pp. 13– 46; Spaventa, E. (2009). Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees, 
On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects. Common Market Law 
Review 45(1), pp. 13– 45; Costello, C. (2011). Citizenship of the Union: Above Abuse? In: De 
La Feria, and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. cit., p. 321 et seq.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C- 370/ 90, Singh; judgment of 23 September 
2003, case C- 109/ 01, Akrich; judgment of 11 December 2007, case C- 291/ 05, Eind; judgment 
of 25 July 2008, case C- 127/ 08, Metock and Others; judgment of 12 March 2014, case C- 
456/ 12, O. and B., paras. 51– 61; judgment of 5 June 2018, case C- 673/ 16, Coman and Others, 
paras. 24, 40, 51– 53; judgment of 27 June 2018, case C- 230/ 17, Altiner and Ravn; judgment 
of 12 July 2018, case C- 89/ 17, Banger; Watson, P. (1993). Free Movement of Workers – A One 
Way Ticket? Case C- 370/ 90 The Queen v. Immigation Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh. 
Industrial Law Journal 22 (1), pp.  68– 77; Bierbach, J.  (2008). European Citizens’ Third- 
Country Family Members and Community Law: Grand Chamber decision of 11 December 
2007, Case C- 291/ 05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R.N.G. Eind – The 
return of the member state national and the destiny of the European citizen. European 
Constitutional Law Review 4 (2), pp. 344– 362.; Costello, C. (2009). Metock: Free Movement 
and “Normal Family Life” in the Union. Common Market Law Review 46 (2), pp. 587– 622; 
Cambien, N.  (2009). Case C- 127/ 08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v.  Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Columbia Journal of European Law 15 (2), pp. 321– 342; 
Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers: O and B, 
and S and G. Common Market Law Review 52 (3), pp. 753– 777; Van Eijken, H. (2014). De 
Zaken S. en G. & O. en B.: Grenzeloze Gezinnen en Afgeleide Verblijfsrechten. Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 10, pp. 319– 324.
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construction makes it possible to circumvent the national family reunification 
rules by temporarily moving to another Member State and then come back, 
which exempts the family from the applicability of national law.
Circumventing national legislation on family reunification by acquiring res-
idence rights in another Member State and then return with them without 
intervention of national law17 is called the “Europe- route”.18 The availability 
of the Europe- route empowers EU citizens to change the legal regime that ap-
plies to them and thereby partly remedies the inequality that exists between 
EU citizens that benefit from EU law and those who do not. Thereby it could 
offer a form of reconciliation for reverse discrimination. At the same time, 
however, the availability of the Europe- route curtails the competence of the 
Member States to regulate the position of their own nationals.19 To prevent 
express circumvention of applicable national immigration law through use of 
the Europe- route, art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 gives Member States the possi-
bility to classify the use of EU rights as abuse of law and refuse or withdraw the 
residence rights EU citizens’ family members derive thereof.20 The legitimate 
 17 Faull, J. (2011). Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. 291 et seq., especially p. 293; COSTELLO, 
C.  (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p.  321 et seq.; Groenendijk, K.  (2014). Reverse 
Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin, cit., 
p.  169 et seq.; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  117 et seq. 
Circumvention of EU law may also be relevant when national law does not allow for gay 
marriage. In Coman and Others, cit., the Court decided that gay marriage and the per-
taining rights that are obtained in another Member State can also be brought back to the 
home Member State, thereby evading the impossibility of gay marriage that exists in some 
Member States. See: Tryfonidou, A. (2018). Free Movement of Same- sex Spouses Within 
the EU: The ECJ’s Coman Judgment. European Law Blog, available at europeanlawblog.eu; 
Kroeze, H.H.C., and Safradin, B. (2019). Een Overwinning voor vrij Verkeersrechten van 
Regenboogfamilies in Europa: Het Langverwachte Coman Arrest. Nederlands Tijdschrift 
voor Europees Recht 1– 2, pp. 51– 59. A precondition that is set to bring rights back home is 
that residence in the host Member State has been genuine. See O. and B. cit., paras. 51– 61 
and Coman and Others, cit., paras. 24, 40, 51– 53.
 18 Member States did not receive this decrease in their competence with open arms, and 
a discourse arose about “closing the Europe- route”. In this discourse it is suggested that 
(purposeful) circumvention of national family reunification rules by temporarily mov-
ing to another Member States to fall within the application of the more lenient EU law 
on family reunification should be a ground to refuse the rights that are pursued. Most 
notably in the Netherlands. See Parliamentary Document 29 700, Amendment of the 
Immigration Law 2000 with regard to the integration requirement, no. 31: Letter from the 
Minister for Immigration and Integration to the Parliament, zoek.officielebekendmakin-
gen.nl. Also see: Costello, C. (2009). Metock, cit., p. 587 et seq.
 19 And it makes less favorable treatment of nationals who cannot bring themselves within 
the scope of EU law even more pronounced. See the argument below.
 20 Singh, cit., para. 24, see infra; Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship 
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concern of Member States to avoid circumvention of their national laws can 
be contrasted with the individual’s wish to live together with his family, which 
is protected by human rights law. The European Convention of Human Rights 
protects the right to family life and the right to marry. These rights are not abso-
lute and do not impose “a general obligation […] to respect the choice by mar-
ried couples of the country of their matrimonial residence or to authorise fam-
ily reunification on its territory”.21 Yet, since the beginning of the 21st century, 
the European Court of Human Rights demonstrated a “readiness to extend the 
protective reach of Article 8 [of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(echr)] in the field of immigration”.22 In light of the protection of the family, 
it is uncomfortable in itself that the EU legal system is so fragmented that EU 
citizens are in need of circumventing their national laws to be together with 
their loved ones in the first place.23 A tension exists between the citizen’s right 
to love,24 and the Member State’s “right to control the entry of non- nationals 
into its territory”, which limits the possibilities the circumvent their national 
law.25 To protect the Member States’ discretion in defining and maintaining 
 21 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/ 80, 9473/ 81 and 
9474/ 81, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, para. 68; judgment of 
31 January 2006, no. 50435/ 99, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, para. 
39; judgment of 3 October 2014, no. 12738/ 10, Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, para. 107.
 22 THYM, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 echr in Immigration 
Cases:  A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay? International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 57 (1), pp.  87– 112, 111; e.g. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 
December 2001, no.  31465/ 96, Sen v.  the Netherlands; judgment of 1 December 2005, 
no. 60665/ 00, Tuquabo- Tekle et al v. the Netherlands.
 23 Much can be said about this perspective. One insight is that EU law is an institute of 
exclusion, be- ause it only privileges the “good citizens” who add to the establishment 
of the internal market. Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars, cit., pp. 59– 62; Azoulai, 
L.  (2017). Transfiguring European Citizenship:  From Member State Territory to Union 
Territory. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit.; Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned 
Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship Through Its Scope. In: Kochenov, ed., EU 
Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p.  220 et seq.; O’Brien, C.  (2017). Unity in Adversity:  EU 
Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK. London:  Bloomsbury 
Publishing. Also see:  Iglesias Sánchez, S.  (2017). A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right 
Not to Move in a Union Based on Free Movement. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit.
 24 D’Aoust, A.M. (2014). Love as Project of (Im)Mobility:  Love, Sovereignty and 
Governmentality in Marriage Migration Management Practices. Global Society 28 (3), 
pp. 317– 335; Karst, K.L. (1980). The Freedom of Intimate Association. The Yale Law Journal 
89 (4), pp. 624– 692.
 25 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v.  the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da 
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their national policy choices, they can us the concept of abuse of rights26 to 
limit the circumvention of national law. Abuse of law is defined as a situation 
in which the conditions to acquire a right are formally fulfilled, whereas the 
conduct that led to conferral of the right does not meet the purpose for which 
the right was conferred.27 Since abuse of law is characterized by the fact that 
the conditions to acquire a right are formally fulfilled, limiting those rights on 
the ground of that abuse may be contrary to the principle of legal certainty.28 
In the interest of legal certainty, and in the interest of the individual’s right to 
love and live with his family, it is therefore necessary to carefully delineate the 
scope of application of abuse of law in the context of EU family reunification, 
which is the main purpose of this contribution. By determining the width of 
the scope of EU law, the remaining discretionary competence that is left to the 
Member States also becomes clearer.29 When abuse of law is given a broad in-
terpretation, Member States can more easily rely on it and have more leeway in 
enforcing their national rules at the expense of limiting the rights that derive 
from EU law. Conversely, when abuse of law is given a narrow interpretation, 
it is more difficult for Member States to rely on it and is more difficult to take 
away EU rights. A broad interpretation of abuse of law thus favours Member 
States’ interests in protecting their competence to regulate the legal position 
of their nationals, and a narrow interpretation favours the effectiveness of EU 
law, and the individual’s right to love and live with his family.
This research addresses abuse of EU law in the context of family reunifica-
tion between a third- country national and an EU citizen to acquire a residence 
right. The main research question is how genuine use of EU law for the pur-
pose of family reunification, and abuse of EU law that is used to circumvent 
national immigration law can be distinguished. Two types of possible abuse 
are considered, the conclusion of marriages of convenience and the circum-
vention of national law through use of the Europe- route. Both types of con-
duct are aimed at bringing a case of immigration or family reunification within 
the scope of EU law to benefit from a more lenient immigration/ family reuni-
fication regime. Social welfare tourism as a form of abuse of free movement 
law is excluded from the analysis, with the exception of those cases that are 
 26 Abuse of law and abuse of rights are used interchangeable in this contribution.
 27 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers. In: De 
La Feria, and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. cit., p. 296. See infra.
 28 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 295 et seq., especially p. 296; Poiares Maduro, M. (2011). Foreword. In: De La Feria, and 
Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law. cit., p. vii.
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conducive to understanding the concept of abuse of law in the context of fam-
ily reunification.30 Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 also mentions fraud a a reason 
to refuse, terminate or withdraw rights. Fraud “may be defined as deliberate 
deception or contrivance made to obtain the right of free movement and resi-
dence under the Directive. In the context of the Directive, fraud is likely to be 
limited to forgery of documents or false representation of a material fact con-
cerning the conditions attached to the right of residence”.31 Abuse of law, on 
the other hand, refers to “an artificial conduct entered into solely with the pur-
pose of obtaining the right of free movement and residence under Community 
law which, albeit formally observing of the conditions laid down by Commu-
nity rules, does not comply with the purpose of those rules”.32 Therefore, the 
difference between fraud and abuse is that in case of abuse, the conditions for 
acquiring a right are fulfilled, whilst in the case of fraud, information is falsified 
to make it seem like they are fulfilled when they are not. This contribution only 
deals with abuse of law and not with fraud.
The second chapter of the contribution will introduce the legal and political 
context in which reverse discrimination and (ab)use of rights for the purpose 
of family reunification are positioned. Particular attention will be given to the 
federalist- citizenship contraposition that is apparent in the EU constitutional 
struggle and mitigated by the introduction of the concept of abuse of law. This 
part will also explore the role of the echr as a complementary source of pro-
tection when situations fall outside the scope of EU law. The third chapter of 
this contribution addresses the Member States’ concern about circumvention 
of their national immigration laws. To deal with this circumvention, they may 
classify the use of free movement rights as abuse of EU law and refuse or with-
draw residence rights that are derived thereof. Doing so, however, may com-
promise legal certainty. Chapters four until seven apply the concept of abuse 
in a family reunification context, and aims to delineate te scope of abuse in 
 30 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 295 et seq., especially p. 300 et seq.; Mantu, S.A., and Minderhoud, P.E. (2016). Exploring 
the Limits of Social Solidarity. Welfare Tourism and EU Citizenship. UNIO  – EU Law 
Journal 2 (2), pp. 4– 19.
 31 Communication com(2009) 313 final of 2 July 2009 from the Commission on the appli-
cation of Directive 2004/ 38, p. 15, point 4.1.1; Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 1997, 
case C- 285/ 95, Kol v. Land Berlin, para. 29; judgment of 27 September 2001, case C- 63/ 99, 
Gloszczuk, para. 75; Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement 
of Workers, cit., p. 295 et seq. especially p. 296.
 32 Communication com(2009) 313, cit., p.  15, point 4.1.2; Court of Justice, judgment of 14 
December 2000, case C- 110/ 99, Emsland- Stärke, para. 52 et seq.; judgment of 9 March 1999, 
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this area of the law. The seventh chapter elaborates on the question when res-
idence in another Member State is sufficiently genuine to retain family mem-
bers’ residence rights upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen. 
It is demonstrated that the creation and strengthening of family life is the cen-
tral criterion that needs to be taken into account. The eighth section evaluates 
these conditions and further elaborates upon the distinction between abuse 
of law and noncompliance with the applicable conditions for family reunifi-
cation. The nineth and last section, finally, discusses the most recent case- law 
of the Court which deals with the personal scope of family reunification under 
EU free movement law in return situations, and in general. The importance of 
the research is to add to the understanding of abuse of law in a family reuni-
fication context and to inquire about its implications for legal certainty and 
judicial protection in the EU. In addition, the research aims to position the 
theme of reverse discrimination in a broader constitutional context. Last but 
not least, the contribution sheds light on the complexities of the return situ-
ation and further discusses under which circumstances a residence right can 
be derived after the exercise of free movement rights upon return in the home 
Member State of the EU citizen.
ii Reverse Discrimination: Colliding Constitutional Principles 
in EU Law
It can be deduced from the text of the Treaties,33 and many sources of second-
ary law, that European law- makers in the past and in the present have attached 
great importance to equality in EU law.34 In fact, it is considered to be “one of 
the fundamental values people throughout Europe can agree upon” as a result 
of a “longstanding tradition of egalitarian discourse […] on the old continent”.35 
“As a consequence, European equality law opens up a space in which Europe-
an citizens feel included in the broader integration project”.36 Citizenship as 
the manifestation of equality may, however, collide with other constitutional 
principles of the EU, which as an international organization goes further than 
merely intergovernmental cooperation and very much resembles a federalist 
 33 E.g. Art. 2 teu; Art. 18 tfeu; Title iii on Equality, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Charter).
 34 Croon- Gestefeld, J.  (2017). Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p.  1 et seq.; 
Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 162– 166.
 35 Croon- Gestefeld, J. (2017). Reconceptualising European Equality Law, cit., p. 3.
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entity.37 Upholding the federal balance requires a compromise between the 
need of the EU to have sufficient competences to achieve the common goals 
for which it was established, and preserving the sovereignty of its Member 
States.38 The competences of the EU are, therefore, limited by the principle of 
conferral, which is translated into the division of competences.39 Through this 
principle, the EU is shaped into a type of multi- level governance system, which 
pursues an optimal allocation of regulatory competences. Allocation of these 
competences is directed by the principle of subsidiarity, which means that 
competences are exercised at the level of government that is best positioned 
to regulate a specific issue. The EU may only intervene if it is able to act more 
effectively than the Member States at their respective national or local levels.40
Contrary to the notion of equal citizenship, the division of competences 
implies the possibility of unequal treatment among citizens, because the rules 
that are applicable to an individual may vary according to the level of gover-
nance where the competence to regulate the situation rests. The attachment of 
European decision- makers to equality does not preclude differentiation, since 
“the simple fact that we may agree that equality takes up a prominent place in 
European law tells us little about its functioning or how we should evaluate its 
application”.41 Its functioning seems to be limited to the protection of equality 
within a legal regime – either in the EU or in a Member State – without real 
consideration for the differences that exist between these legal regimes. Thus, 
a tension exists between equal citizenship and the division of competences. In 
the EU this tension is particularly noticeable when EU citizens who reside in 
their own Member State and do not fall within the scope of EU law enjoy less 
protection than those who reside in a Member State of which they are not a 
 37 Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars, cit., p. 1 et seq., especially pp. 16– 35; Nic Shuibhne, 
N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What Are the Implications for 
the Citizen When the Polity Bargain Is Privileged? In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit., p.  147 et seq., especially p.  148; Zweifel, T.D. (2002). Democratic Deficit? 
Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States in 
Comparative Perspective. Oxford:  Lexington Books; Menon, A., and Schain, M.  (2006). 
Comparative Federalism:  The European Union and the United States in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford:  Oxford University Press; Lenaerts, K.  (1997). Federalism:  Essential 
Concepts in Evolution. Fordham International Law Journal 21 (3), pp. 746– 798.
 38 Nic Shuibhne, N. (2017). Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship, cit., p. 147 et seq., 
especially p. 149; Lenaerts, K. (1997). Federalism, cit., p. 746 et seq., 775.
 39 Arts 4, para. 1, and 5, paras. 1– 2, teu, Arts 2– 6 tfeu.
 40 Art. 5, para. 3, teu; Protocol no.  2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality; SCHÜTZE, R.  (2009). Subsidiarity After Lisbon:  Reinforcing the 
Safeguards of Federalism? The Cambridge Law Journal 68 (3), pp. 525– 536.
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national. The occurrence of this inequality causes the reverse discrimination, 
which was mentioned in the introduction.42 “Reverse” means that the group 
that is being discriminated against is an unexpected group, which is treated 
less favourably in comparison with another group which normally would re-
ceive the inferior treatment.43 More specifically, it is normally expected that 
“insiders” enjoy more privileges than “outsiders”, but when citizens are reverse-
ly discriminated, the opposite situation exists.44
Reverse discrimination occurs
due to the fact that, in order to further the Community’s central aim of es-
tablishing a common market, [EU] law […] grants rights to [persons] that 
fall within its scope by virtue of their contribution to the construction of 
the internal market, that are more generous or flexible than those that are 
provided by national laws to persons […] that are deemed to fall within the 
scope of application of national law, as a result of the application of the pure-
ly internal rule. […] Accordingly, there may be a difference in treatment.45
In other words, because the EU originated from an economic rationale, the 
Union’s competence only extends to the legal position of EU citizens who 
move between Member States, because they contribute to the establishment 
of the internal market.46 Purely internal situations, which are confined in all 
 42 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 13– 18; Verbist, V. (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., pp. 3– 10; Davies, G. (2003). Nationality 
Discrimination in the European Internal Market, cit.; Poiares Maduro, M. (2000). The Scope 
of European Remedies, cit.; Van Elsuwege, P., and Kochenov, D.  (2011). On the Limits 
of Judicial Intervention, cit.; Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely 
Internal Situations, cit.; Hanf, D. (2011). Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional 
Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice?, cit.; Oosterom- Staples, H. (2012). 
To What Extent Has Reverse Discrimination Been Reversed?, cit.; Groenendijk, K. (2014). 
Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union Citizens of Immigrant Origin, 
cit.; O’Leary, S.  (2009). The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU 
Law, cit.; Spaventa, E. (2009). Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees, cit.; Costello, C. (2011). 
Citizenship of the Union, cit.
 43 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 3, 14; Verbist, V. (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 3.
 44 Carens, J.H. (2013). The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, p.  185 
et seq.
 45 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 14.
 46 Ibid., p.  7, 129 et seq., p.  166; Verbist, V.  (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European 
Union, cit., pp. 69– 70; Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We 
the Burden? London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p.  15 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The 
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relevant aspects to a single Member States, on the other hand, fall outside the 
scope of EU law.47
The purpose of introducing the right to family reunification as an an-
cillary to free movement rights was to facilitate the movement that would 
contribute to the establishment of the internal market. Not being able to 
bring one’s family was considered to be an obstacle to move, and removing 
that obstacle by facilitating family reunification was expected to increase 
the chance that workers and self- employed would go abroad. Moreover, it 
was thought that being able to enjoy family life in the host country would 
diminish the need to retain strong ties to the home Member State, which 
would stimulate integration in the host Member State and, again, facilitate 
free movement.48 Nationals who resided in their own Member State, on the 
other hand, did not contribute to the establishment of the internal mar-
ket. They were thus not protected by EU law and not eligible for the family 
1614; Dautricourt, C., and Thomas, S. (2009). Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement 
of Persons Under Community Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing for Penelope? European Law 
Review 34 (4), pp. 433– 454, 454, 436; O’Leary, S. (2009). The Past, Present and Future of the 
Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, cit., p. 13 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2002). Free Movement 
of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On. Common Market Law Review 
39 (4), pp. 731– 771. An exception to this economic rationale for conferring family reunifi-
cation rights seems to have emerged in the Ruiz Zambrano case- law, in which a residence 
right was granted to the Colombian parents of Belgian children by virtue of them being 
an EU citizen and enjoying the right to reside, rather than contributing to the economic 
objectives of the internal market. To discuss these rights falls outside the scope of this 
contribution, however, which focuses only on the applicability and analogous applica-
bility of Directive 2004/ 38, after exercising free movement rights. For reliance on these 
rights the requirement to make use of free movement rights has persisted. Also see infra, 
footnote 58.
 47 Art. 3, para. 1, of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.; case- law e.g., Court of Justice, judgment of 7 
February 1979, case 115/ 78, Knoors v.  Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, para. 24; 
judgment of 28 March 1979, case 175/ 78, The Queen v. Saunders, para. 11; judgment of 27 
October 1982, joined cases 35 and 36/ 82, Morson and Jhanjan, para. 18; judgment of 5 June 
1997, joined cases C- 64/ 96 and C- 65/ 96, Land Nordrhein- Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet, 
para. 16; O. and B., cit., para. 36; Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, 
cit., pp.  7– 10, 42– 44, 49– 50; Verbist, V.  (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European 
Union, cit., pp. 5– 6, 19, 21– 26, 69– 70; Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., Lodder, G., and Wouters, 
K.  (2014). European Migration Law, cit., p. 49; O’Leary, S.  (2009). The Past, Present and 
Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, cit., p. 13 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2002). 
Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule, cit., p. 731.
 48 Berneri, C.  (2017). Family Reunification in the EU, cit., p.  8; Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., 
Lodder, G., and Wouters, K.  (2014). European Migration Law, cit., p.  30; Tryfonidou, 
A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  96 et seq.; Recitals 18, 23– 24 of the 
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reunification rights guaranteed by EU free movement law. Additionally, it 
was assumed they did not need EU law protection to secure their right to 
reside and work, because by virtue of their national citizenship they already 
enjoy those rights indiscriminately.49 The rights that were provided to them 
by national law did not always, however, include a right to family reunifi-
cation that was comparable to the equivalent right in EU law. As a result, 
when the national legislation that applies to these citizens offers other or 
less rights than EU law does, they are reversely discriminated in comparison 
with nationals from other Member States who do benefit from EU law for 
the purpose of family  reunification.50
In general, Member States do not “want to discriminate against their own 
nationals”, but reverse discrimination occurs “because [Union] law obliges 
States to treat nationals of other Member States in a way which – by reasons of 
their own policies and aims – they did not originally intend to treat their own 
nationals”.51 Thus, when national legislation infringes EU free movement law, 
it must only be set aside for EU citizens who, by virtue of their movement to 
another Member State, fall within the scope of EU law. Nationals of the con-
cerned Member State who did not make use of free movement rights, on the 
other hand, fall outside the protection of EU law, so to them the national legis-
lation continues to apply and as a result they are reversely discriminated. “Re-
verse discrimination is [thus] a side effect of the limited scope of application 
of EU law”.52 In other cases, reverse discrimination may be “a deliberate choice 
of the national legislator to (continue to) apply stricter conditions to purely 
internal situations in order to pursue their own national policy”.53 For family 
reunification, this deliberate choice is made by several of the Member States, 
including Belgium and the Netherlands.54
 49 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C- 434/ 09, McCarthy, paras. 28– 29; O. and 
B., cit., para. 42; Art. 3 of Protocol no. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms securing certain rights and freedoms other than those 
already included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto.
 50 Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  7; Verbist, V.  (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p.  69 et seq.; Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). 
Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law, cit., p. 15 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The 
Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, cit., p. 1597 et seq., especially p. 1614.
 51 Poiares Maduro, M. (2000). The Scope of European Remedies, cit., p. 127; Verbist, V. (2017). 
Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 4.
 52 Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 42.
 53 Ibid., pp.  4– 5. In some cases, Member States may introduce stricter requirements to 
advantage their own nationals (i.e. requiring stricter qualifications of specific profession-
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The viability of continuing to uphold the economic premises on which the 
EU was built and to continue to allow the existence of reverse discrimination 
can be questioned, of course, and if the EU does not start to prioritize the in-
clusion of its citizens more than it does now, its legitimacy may be seriously 
undermined.55 At the same time, the EU Treaties provide constitutional pro-
tection to EU citizenship and the principle of equality, as well as to the divi-
sion of competences. Reconciliation of these principles should, therefore, take 
place within the boundaries of those Treaties, within the EU’s constitutional 
system. In exploring possible reconciliation, some scholars have examined 
whether reverse discrimination should fall within the scope of Art. 18 tfeu, 
which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality.56 The Court of 
Justice rejected this possibility, however, because the difference in treatment 
did not constitute “an obstacle to the construction of the internal market”.57
 55 E.g. Kochenov, D.  (2010). Citizenship Without Respect, cit.; Kochenov, D.  (2008) 
Ius Tractum of Many Faces:  European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
Between Status and Rights. Columbia Journal of European Law 15 (2), pp.  169– 238; 
Kostakopoulou, D.  (2007). European Union Citizenship:  Writing the Future. European 
Law Journal 13 (5), pp. 623– 646; Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European 
Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change. The Modern Law Review 68 (2), pp. 233– 267; 
Kostakopoulou, D., and Kostakopoulou, T. (2001). Citizenship, Identity, and Immigration in 
the European Union: Between Past and Future. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 
O’Brien, C. (2017). Unity in Adversity, cit.
 56 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 18 et seq.; Opinion of AG 
Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano, paras. 123– 150; 
Spaventa, E. (2004). From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non- )Economic European 
Constitution. Common Market Law Review 41(3), pp.  743– 773, 771; Spaventa, E.  (2017). 
Earned Citizenship, cit., p. 204 et seq., especially p. 204; Spaventa, E. (2009). Seeing the 
Wood Despite the Trees, cit., pp.  13– 45; Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its 
Limits in EU Law, cit., pp. 16– 19; Adam, S., and Van Elsuwege, P. (2012). Citizenship Rights 
and the Federal Balance Between the European Union and Its Member States: Comment 
on Dereci. European Law Review 37 (2), pp. 176– 190, 188 et seq.
 57 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 February 1987, case 98/ 86, Ministére public v.  Mathot, 
paras. 7– 8; judgment of 15 January 1986, case 44/ 84, Hurd v. Jones, paras. 54– 56; judgment 
of 23 October 1986, case 355/ 85, Driancourt v. Cognet, paras. 10– 11; judgment of 16 June 
1994, case C- 132/ 93, Steen v.  Deutsche Bundespost; judgment of 29 January 2004, case 
C- 253/ 01, Krüger; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p.  18 et 
seq.; VERBIST, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 25 et seq.; 
Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law, cit., p. 16 et seq.; Adam, 
S., and Van Elsuwege, P. (2012). Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance Between the 
European Union and Its Member States, cit., p.  188 et seq.; Spaventa, E.  (2017). Earned 
Citizenship, cit., p.  204 et seq. The restricted applicability of Art. 18 TFEU is also men-
tioned in the provision itself, which limits its applicability to those cases that fall “within 
the scope of the Treaties”. See: Neuvonen, P.J. (2016). Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU 
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An alternative option for reconciliation could be that reverse discrimina-
tion can exist within reasonable boundaries of equality. These reasonable 
boundaries are not to be considered as fixed limits to reverse discrimination 
that should be enforced by the EU or its Member States, but as a balancing ex-
ercise that mitigates some of the inequality that is caused by the system with-
out defying the division of competences. In this way, a solution could be found 
in finding “a way around” reverse discrimination and become more equal, so 
to say. For family reunification rights, the Court seems to have adopted such an 
approach in its case- law.58 It did so, for instance, by making the entitlement 
to the status of a worker dependent on a communitarian concept of being a 
worker instead, which ruled out the relevance of national interpretations.59 
Expanding the scope of the freedom of workers also expanded the scope of 
potential beneficiaries to the family reunification rights that are attached to 
 58 Here I only discuss family reunification rights on the basis of Art. 21 tfeu and Directive 
2004/ 38, cit. Family reunification rights derived from Art. 20 tfeu pursuant to the Ruiz 
Zambrano line of case- law is left out of the analysis. Ruiz Zambrano concerned a purely 
internal situation which was brought within the scope of EU law, because expulsion of 
the Colombian parents would force their Belgian children to leave the territory of the EU 
(in order to follow the parents), which would deprive them of the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights they enjoy by virtue of their citizenship. In literature it 
has been discussed extensively whether and to what extent the Art. 20 tfeu case- law 
could remedy the lack of protection for EU citizens who reside in their own Member State 
and have never made use of free movement law. E.g. Kochenov, ed. (2017). EU Citizenship 
and Federalism, cit., discusses among other issues the question to what extent this line 
of case- law has added to give true meaning to European citizenship through a critical 
lens. Other examples of relevant sources are: Hailbronner, K., and Thym, D. (2011), Case C- 
34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office National de l’Emploi. Common Market Law Review 
48 (4), pp. 1253– 1270; Van Elsuwege, P. (2011). Shifting the Boundaries? European Union 
Citizenship and the Scope of Application of EU Law – Case No. C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v. Office National de l’Emploi. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 38 (3), pp. 263– 
276; Adam, S., and Van Elsuwege, P.  (2012). Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance 
Between the European Union and Its Member States, cit., p. 176 et seq.; Van Elsuwege, P., 
and Kochenov, D. (2011). On the Limits of Judicial Intervention, cit.; Van Eijken, H., and DE 
Vries, S. (2011). A New Route into the Promised Land? Being a European Citizen After Ruiz 
Zambrano. European Law Review 36 (5), pp. 704– 721; Kochenov, D.  (2013). The Right to 
Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification. European Law Journal 19 (4), 
pp. 502– 516; Kochenov, D. (2011). A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A 
Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. Columbia Journal of European 
Law 18 (1), pp. 56– 109; Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). The Substance of Rights – New Pieces of the 
Ruiz Zambrano Puzzle. European Law Review 41 (2), pp. 238– 256.
 59 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 July 1986, case 66/ 85, Lawrie- Blum v.  Land Baden- 
Wüttemberg, para. 21; judgment of 23 March 1983, case 53/ 81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie, para. 23; Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of 
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the status of a worker. Similarly, the Court has always refused to introduce a 
fixed income requirement for family reunification. Instead, sufficient resourc-
es are assessed on a case- by- case basis.60 Additionally, and most important 
for this contribution is the earlier mentioned line of case- law which entails 
that when an EU citizen who has made use of the free movement of persons 
rights returns to his home Member State, the situation is no longer considered 
purely internal and is brought within the scope of Union law. The benefit that 
stems from continuing to fall within the scope of EU law is that EU citizens’ 
family members who acquired a residence right in the host state can retain 
those rights when they return to the home Member State of their EU family 
member. The only condition to retain these rights is that residence in the host 
Member State must have been genuine.61 If that is the case, the family member 
does not need to comply with the conditions for family reunification that are 
posed by the national law of that Member State.62 The case- law is motivated 
by the same economic discourse on which European integration was built, and 
in essence, entails that effectively exercising economic freedoms also implies 
the possibility to rely on EU law upon return to the home Member State. Safe-
guarding the effectiveness of EU law is critical because otherwise an individual 
could be deterred from using his rights in the first place.63
 60 Art. 7, para. 1, let. b), of Directive 2004/ 38, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 10 April 2008, 
case C- 398/ 06, Commission v. Netherlands; judgment of 19 September 2013, case C- 140/ 12, 
Brey; Minderhoud, P.E. (2015). Sufficient Resources and Residence Rights Under Directive 
2004/ 38. Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series 3/ 2015.
 61 O. and B., cit., paras. 51– 61; Coman and Others, cit., paras. 24, 40, 51– 53.
 62 The Queen v.  Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of 
State for Home Department, cit.; Akrich, cit.; Eind, cit.; Metock and Others, cit.; O. and B., 
cit.; Coman and Others, cit.; Altiner and Ravn, cit.; Banger, cit.; Watson, P. (1993). Free 
Movement of Workers – A One Way Ticket? Case C- 370/ 90 The Queen v. Immigation 
Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh. Industrial Law Journal 22 (1), pp. 68– 77; Bierbach, 
J. (2008). European Citizens’ Third- Country Family Members and Community Law, cit., 
p. 344 et seq.; Costello, C. (2009). Metock, cit.; Cambien, N. (2009). Case C- 127/ 08, Blaise 
Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, cit., p. 321 
et seq.; Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers, 
cit., p.  753 et seq.; Van Eijken, H.  (2014). De Zaken S.  en G.  & O.  en B.:  Grenzeloze 
Gezinnen en Afgeleide Verblijfsrechten. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 10, 
pp. 319– 324.
 63 The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State 
for Home Department, cit., paras. 19– 20; Akrich, cit., paras. 53– 54; Eind, cit., paras. 35– 36; 
Metock and Others, cit., paras. 64, 89– 92; O.  and B., cit., paras. 46, 52– 54; Coman and 
Others, cit., para. 24; Altiner and Ravn, cit., Banger, cit., para. 28; for a closer look upon the 
rationale of this doctrine, see the Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 10 April 2018, case 
C- 89/ 17, Rozanne Banger, paras. 27– 47; Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in 
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The case- law of the Court empowers individual citizens to bring them-
selves within the scope of EU law and benefit from more lenient rules ap-
plicable to family reunification, and can, thus, be considered as a form of 
reconciliation for those who are reversely discriminated. At the same time, 
this reconciliation requires movement to another Member State which can 
be unaffordable (due to finances or language barriers), in particular, because 
residence in the host state must be genuine before rights can be retained in 
the home Member State.64 This means that EU citizenship and the pertaining 
family reunification rights are reserved for the privileged “good” citizens who 
can afford to move and thus contribute to the internal market.65 Another is-
sue that is revealed when the scope of EU law is enhanced, is that it becomes 
increasingly difficult to justify why some citizens are still not included.66 It is 
acknowledged that the approximation of legal regimes and the empowerment 
of citizens is limited and compromised by these liabilities but it may be as 
much as is feasible within the constitutional limitations of EU law. Further 
remedies to reverse discrimination should then come from the legislator and 
ultimately from the Member States.67 They should take their responsibility in 
the EU as a co- legislator in the Council of Ministers or – when the EU lacks 
the competence to do so – outside the EU by resolving reverse discrimination 
on the basis of national law. Some of the Member States such as France, Italy 
and Austria, indeed, assumed this responsibility when their respective nation-
al courts decided that the principle of equality, that is protected by their own 
constitution, prohibits reverse discrimination.68 This approach has led to the 
extended application of EU law to those situations, on the basis of national 
law. The solution does not eliminate the purely internal rule but it does elim-
inate reverse discrimination. It is called “voluntary adoption”, “spontaneous 
harmonization” or “renvoi”.69
the European Internal Market, cit., p. 119 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience 
of EU Market Citizenship, cit., p. 1612.
 64 O. and B., cit., paras. 51– 61; Coman and Others, cit., paras. 24, 40, 51– 53.
 65 Kochenov, D. (2017). On Tiles and Pillars, cit., pp. 59– 62; Azoulai, L. (2017). Transfiguring 
European Citizenship, cit., p. 178 et seq.; Spaventa, E. (2017). Earned Citizenship, cit., p. 220 
et seq.; O’Brien, C. (2017). Unity in Adversity, cit.
 66 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 116 et seq.; Nic Shuibhne, 
N.  (2002). Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule, p.  731 et seq.; Nic 
Shuibhne, N.  (2002). The European Union and Fundamental Rights:  Well in Spirit but 
Considerably Rumpled in Body? In: Beaumont, Lyons, and Walker, eds., Convergence and 
Divergence in European Public Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002, pp. 177, 192.
 67 For instance on the basis of Art. 79 tfeu.
 68 Tryfonidou, A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 121– 123.
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Another component of the protection of the family that mustn’t be forgotten, 
lastly, is the protection of Art. 8 echr. The Court of Justice recalled in its case- law 
that if EU law does not provide entitlement to a residence right “regard must be 
had to respect for family life under Article 8” of the echr.70 As was mentioned 
in the introduction, the protection of family life does not give an entitlement to 
choose the country of matrimonial residence.71 Quite the opposite, the echr is 
intentionally silent on matters of immigration. Admission to a Member State 
can, therefore, only be examined “through the effects of state measures on other 
human rights of the foreigners concerned”.72 In addition, the Member States are 
awarded a margin of appreciation in their decision- making. As a result, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights only examines whether the decision was reasonable, 
and does not go into the choices of national policy, which are made by the Mem-
ber States.73 Nevertheless, the Court shows a readiness to “correct intolerable out-
comes in individual cases”,74 which gives an alternative prospect to those who do 
not and cannot benefit from EU law for the purpose of family reunification.75
iii Abuse of EU Law – Definition and Background
Since 1974, the concept of law abuse is part of EU law.76 Its coming into being 
was inspired by the use of the concept in some of the Member States, even 
 70 Akrich, cit., para. 58; a few years later it mentioned in Metock and Others, cit., para. 
79, that even though reverse discrimination does not fall within the scope of EU law, 
the Member States are all parties to the echr. In more recent cases such as O.  and 
B., cit., Coman and Others, cit., Altiner and Ravn, cit., and Banger, cit. the Court has 
neglected to refer to the echr but this does not mean that its complementarity ceased 
to exist.
 71 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da Silva 
and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, cit., para. 39; Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit., para. 107.
 72 Thym, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 echr in Immigration 
Cases, cit., p. 103.
 73 Ibid. p.  103 et seq.; Van Elsuwege, P., and Kochenov, D.  (2011). On the Limits of Judicial 
Intervention:  EU Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights. European Journal of 
Migration and Law 13 (4), pp. 443– 466, 461 et seq.
 74 Thym, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life Under Article 8 echr in Immigration 
Cases, cit., p. 107.
 75 Van Elsuwege, P. and Adam, S. (2017). EU Citizenship and the European Federal Challenge 
Through the Prism of Family Reunification. In: Kochenov, ed. (2017). EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, cit., pp. 443– 467, especially p. 460 et seq.
 76 Either as a general principle or as a “principle of construction” but, in any case, the Court 
of Justice takes recourse to the principle in its case- law, e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 
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though, not all Member States are familiar with it in the same way.77 As was 
mentioned above, abuse of law was introduced to resolve some of the tension 
between the effective use of EU law and judicial protection of those who use 
it while maintaining the preservation of the Member States’ competence to 
regulate internal situations. This helps to distinguish between genuine use of 
EU law within the limits that are set by the Court of Justice and use of EU law 
that is meant to circumvent national law, which is, therefore, not a genuine use 
of EU rights. Member States’ reliance on abuse of law thus protects the division 
of competences in a sensitive area of law. Nevertheless, applying abuse of law 
in an EU context also causes the restriction of EU rights. Therefore, invoking 
abuse of law is dependent on the scope of interpretation of abuse of law that is 
given by the Court of Justice. When EU rights are constructed and interpreted 
extensively by the Court, it is more difficult for the Member States to invoke 
abuse of law, even when their national laws are being circumvented. When 
these rights are more narrowly defined by the Court, it is easier to invoke abuse 
of law to restrict rights that go beyond their original purpose.78 In other words, 
the broader the interpretation of EU free movement law, the less discretion 
there is to rely on abuse of law for the Member States and vice versa.79
This sensitivity is reflected in the development of the principle of abuse in 
EU law. In the course of the relevant case- law on abuse of law, a paradigm- 
shift can be observed from the essential purpose towards the sole purpose 
doctrine. The first doctrine entails that when the essential reason to invoke 
Union law does not tally with its purpose, this is classified as abuse of law, 
regardless of whether an additional legitimate purpose – which was not the 
essential purpose – for invoking the law can be found. Abuse of law is easily 
assumed.80 The sole purpose doctrine, on the other hand, entails that abuse of 
law can only be ascertained when there is no other objective distinguishable 
De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds. (2011). Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit.; De La Feria, 
R.  (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law:  The Creation of a New General 
Principle of EC Law Through Tax. Common Market Law Review 45 (2), pp. 395– 441, 436.
 77 And those who do use the principle show considerable differences in the scope with 
which they apply it. De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, 
cit., p. 395.
 78 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 297.
 79 Ibid.
 80 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 June 1988, case 39/ 86, Lair v.  Universität Hannover; 
Vanistendael, F. (2011). Cadbury Schweppes and Abuse from an EU Tax Law Perspective. 
In: De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., pp. 295– 314; Ziegler, 
K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit.; Costello, 
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but the circumvention of national law.81 In that understanding of abuse of law, 
the mere fact that a person consciously places himself in a situation through 
which a certain right can be obtained does not in itself constitute sufficient 
basis to assume that there is an abuse of law.82 This doctrine is based on the no-
tion that as long as a right is invoked in a genuine and effective manner, there 
can be no abuse.83 Thus here, the scope of the concept’s applicability is narrow.
The Court first introduced the concept of abuse of law in 1974 in Van Bins-
bergen. The case concerned a Dutch lawyer who wanted to circumvent the 
professional rules of conduct that were applicable to him in the Netherlands 
by establishing himself in Belgium. Dutch law provided, however, that legal 
representatives should reside in the Netherlands. Van Binsbergen argued that 
this rule was contrary to the freedom to provide services. The Court of Justice 
did not follow this argument and ruled that “[a] Member State cannot be de-
nied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing 
services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory 
[…] for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would 
be applicable to him if he were established within that state”.84 The formula-
tion of the Court in Van Binsbergen seemed to award a broad discretion to the 
Member States, by implying that all circumvention of national rules could be 
contested and give reason to restrict the individual’s rights.85
Van Binsbergen was followed by the so- called “Greek Challenge” cases. 
These cases concerned the reliance of shareholders of Greek public limited 
liability companies on Directive 77/ 91/ EEC on the protection of their rights in 
the context of alterations in the capital of the company. The Greek government 
classified these claims as abuse of EU law, and the national courts asked for 
clarification from the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice considered that, 
despite the right of the Member States to combat abuse of law, reliance on this 
concept should not undermine the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law.86 
 81 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 February 2006, case C- 255/ 02, Halifax and Others; Ziegler, 
K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit.; Costello, 
C. (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p. 321 et seq.
 82 Centros, cit., para. 27.
 83 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, 
case C- 196/ 04, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas.
 84 Van Binsbergen v.  Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, cit., para. 13; De La Feria, 
R.  (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p.  399 et seq.; Tryfonidou, 
A. (2009). Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, cit., p. 54 et seq.
 85 De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 403 et seq.
 86 Court of Justice: judgment of 12 March 1996, case C- 441/ 93, Patifis and Others, para. 68; 
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Hence, the discretionary competence to apply abuse of law was restricted and 
the concept started to obtain a communitarian meaning. In Centros, the Court 
further restricted the Member States’ discretion to invoke abuse of law. The 
case concerned Danish entrepreneurs who established their company in the 
United Kingdom with the sole aim of avoiding Danish law on minimum capi-
tal.87 When the company wanted to open a branch in Denmark, the Danish au-
thorities refused access to the Danish market, because according to them the 
company had abused EU law on freedom of establishment. The Court decided 
differently and considered that the mere fact that a person consciously places 
himself in a situation through which a certain right can be obtained, does not 
in itself constitute an abuse of law. The right to choose the Member State with 
the least restrictive company law to establish a company is “inherent in the 
exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by 
the Treaty”.88 Similarly to Van Binsbergen, the company in Centros had made 
use of a U- turn construction to circumvent national law. Because the Court 
allowed this, it follows from its judgment that circumvention of national law 
does not always qualify as abuse of law.89 Where Van Binsbergen was an exam-
ple of the essential purpose doctrine, with Centros the Court started to move 
towards a sole purpose doctrine.
It also follows from Centros that a distinction is made between use and 
abuse of EU law. Use of EU law cannot lead to restriction of rights, whilst 
abuse can. The question arose how it is possible to distinguish between use 
and abuse of rights. The Court answered this question in Emsland- Stärke, 
which can be used to determine whether a case can be classified as abuse of 
law. Like the earlier cases, Emsland- Stärke concerned a U- turn construction. 
The company exported a potato- based product from Germany to Switzerland 
for which it received an export refund. After the export, they immediately 
returned the products to Germany and sold them there. The question was 
whether this practice was abuse of EU law, which could justify the denial of 
the export refund. The Court considered:  “A finding of abuse requires, first, 
a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal obser-
vance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element 
23 March 2000, C- 373/ 97, Diamantis, paras. 34– 39; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of 
Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 404.
 87 De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 405 et seq.
 88 Centros, cit., para. 27; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, 
cit., p. 405 et seq.
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consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules 
by creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it”.90 By intro-
ducing this two- component test to assess possible abuse of law, the Court 
strongly restricted the discretionary competence of the Member State to de-
cide on the lawfulness of the use of EU law and gave the concept of abuse 
a communitarian meaning.91 Emsland- Stärke was broadly discussed. The 
subjective element of the test was contested because of the difficulty to de-
termine subjective intentions, and the question was asked whether Emsland- 
Stärke could be transposed to other fields of EU law.92 The Court responded 
to these questions and criticism in Halifax.93 This case concerned a banking 
company whose financial services were tax- exempted. Accordingly, when the 
company established new call- centres, Halifax could only recover 5 per cent 
of the Value Added Tax (vat) paid on the construction works. By developing a 
system of a series of transactions involving different companies of the Halifax 
group, it was, nevertheless, able to recover effectively the full amount of vat. 
The question in this case was whether reliance on the right to deduct vat, 
when the transactions on which the right was based were solely effected for 
that particular purpose, would be an abuse of rights. By applying the Emsland- 
Stärke test to the area of vat, it was understood that the two components test 
would become the standardized test for abuse of law.94 Furthermore, Halifax 
seemed to respond to the criticism about the subjective element of the test 
by objectifying it. The Court considered: “An abusive practice will be found to 
exist where […] it is apparent from a number of objective factors, such as the 
 90 Emsland- Stärke, cit., para. 52. Up until today the test is repeated in cases such as Court of 
Justice, judgment of 22 December 2010, case C- 303/ 08, Bozkurt, para. 47; judgment of 16 
October 2012, case C- 364/ 10, Hungary v. Slovakia, para. 58; O. and B., cit., para. 58; De La 
Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 408 et seq.
 91 Vanistendael, F. (2011). Cadbury Schweppes and Abuse from an EU Tax Law Perspective, 
cit., p. 295 et seq.; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., 
p. 408 et seq.
 92 Weber, D. (2004). Abuse of Law – European Court of Justice, 14 December 2000, Case C- 
110/ 99, EmslandStärke. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), pp. 43– 55.
 93 Halifax and Others, cit.; De La Feria, R.  (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition 
of Abuse of Law. In: De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., pp. 
xv- xvi; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 421 et seq.; 
Lenaerts, A. (2010). The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A Critical 
Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract Law. European Review of Private Law 
18 (6), pp. 1121– 1154.
 94 Halifax and Others, cit.; Lenaerts, A. (2010). The General Principle of the Prohibition of 
Abuse of Rights, cit.; De La Feria, R.  (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of 
Abuse of Law, cit., pp. xv- xvi; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) 
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purely artificial nature of the transactions and the links between operators 
involved in the scheme, that the essential aim of those transactions concerned 
was to obtain a tax advantage”.95
In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court extended the scope of application of the 
Emsland- Stärke test, again, to the field of corporate taxation. The case was 
similar to Centros and concerned a UK based company that exercised an eco-
nomic activity on the Irish market. To counter tax- avoidance, the UK had es-
tablished a tax on the income from Ireland, which was disputed before the 
Court of Justice. The Court reiterated the doctrine it had developed until then. 
It considered that nationals of a Member State are not supposed to “improp-
erly circumvent national legislation” or “improperly or fraudulently take ad-
vantage of provisions of Community law”. Yet, the establishment of a branch 
in another Member State “for the purpose of benefitting from the favourable 
tax regime […] does not in itself constitute abuse”.96 The freedom of establish-
ment may, thus, only be restricted to prevent “wholly artificial arrangements”, 
equated with abuse.97 To establish the existence of a “wholly artificial arrange-
ment”, the EmslandStärke test should be applied.98 Cadbury Schweppes can 
be understood as another step of the Court from the essential purpose to-
wards the sole purpose doctrine. This is because the existence of a purpose 
aside from constructing a “wholly artificial” situation to benefit from EU rights 
precludes classification as abuse of law. The existence of such an additional 
purpose, which legitimizes the use of EU law, is recognized when the objective 
of free movement rights has been achieved and reflected in economic reali-
ty.99 “ ‘[P] lanning without abuse’ is a legitimate activity, [and] is reminiscent 
of the idea of ‘legitimate circumvention’ expressed both in Centros, and in the 
post- Centros decisions on establishment”, as long as the rights are effectively 
exercised.100
 95 Halifax and Others, cit., paras. 74, 75, 81; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of 
(Community) Law, cit., p. 422.
 96 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas, cit., paras. 35– 37.
 97 Ibid., para. 57.
 98 Ibid., paras. 64– 65; De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., 
p. 425 et seq.
 99 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas, cit., paras. 64– 65; De La Feria, 
R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 427.
 100 De La Feria, R. (2008). Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law, cit., p. 423 et seq.; For a 
more recent analysis of circumvention of national law for economic purposes by corpora-
tions see Costamagna, F. (2019). At the Roots of Regulatory Competition in the EU: Cross- 
border Movement of Companies as a Way to Exercise a Genuine Economic Activity or 
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iv Abuse in the Context of Family Reunification Rights
In comparison with abuse of law in the context of tax law and free movement 
of services, abuse of law in the context of free movement of persons is a bit of 
an oddity. Scholars tend to either observe the “full rejection of the impact of 
the concept of abuse of law within the field of free movement of workers and 
citizenship”101 or its reduction to a “merely verbal acceptance as a legal prin-
ciple” in free movement law.102 The first case in which this became apparent 
was Lair.103 The question was whether a short period of being a worker was 
sufficient to be eligible for student assistance in the host state on the basis of 
non- discrimination in comparison with the population of that State. German 
law provided that a worker would only be eligible after a period of five years of 
employment. The Court considered that
[i] n so far as […] the three Member States […] are motivated by a desire 
to prevent certain abuses, for example where it may be established on 
the basis of objective evidence that a worker has entered a Member State 
for the sole purpose of enjoying, after a very short period of occupation-
al activity, the benefit of the student assistance system in that State, it 
should be observed that such abuses are not covered by the Community 
provisions in question.104
In the field of free movement, the Court, thus, relied on the sole purpose doc-
trine avant la lettre, about a decade before it was further developed in Centros 
and subsequent case- law.
This dichotomy between free movement of persons and the other freedoms 
is not unique105 and it is often defended on the basis that human beings should, 
indeed, be treated differently than economic transactions.106 Nevertheless, 
 101 La Feria, R. (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. xviii.
 102 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 306.
 103 Lair v. Universität Hannover, cit.
 104 Ibid., para. 43.
 105 Snell, J.  (2004). And then There Were Two:  Products and Citizens in Community Law. 
In: Tridimas and Nebbia, eds., European Union Law for the Twenty- first Century: Volume ii. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing.
 106 De La Feria, R. (2011). Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., p. xix.; 
Opinion of AG Jacobs delivered on 8 March 1989, case 344/ 87, Bettray v. Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie, paras. 28- 19, referring to recital 7 of Regulation (eec) No 1612/ 68 of the 
Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement of workers within the Community, 
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even in the context of free movement rights, the Court does not preclude the 
existence of abuse and the discretion of the Member State to take measures 
against it. On the contrary, it has repeatedly confirmed that Member States are 
allowed to take measures to prevent possible abuse. The question remains how 
such a situation can be distinguished from a genuine use of free movement 
rights. To answer this question, the text of Directive 2004/ 38 and the pertain-
ing Communication on its application, that is issued by the Commission, are 
further examined, as well as the case- law of the Court of Justice.
Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 holds that “Member States may adopt the nec-
essary measures to refuse, terminate, or withdraw any right conferred by this 
Directive in the case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of conve-
nience”.107 One type of abuse of EU law is already mentioned in the provi-
sion, namely the attainment of a residence right on the basis of a marriage 
of convenience.108 The wording of Art. 35 implies, however, that potentially 
other unspecified usages of the Directive could also be classified as abuse. The 
legislator thereby created an – additional – open possibility for the limitation 
of rights, which leaves a legislative gap.109 The question that is answered here 
is whether the U- turn construction to acquire a residence right for a family 
member, by relying on EU law and thereby circumventing national law, also 
constitutes such an abuse of law or not.
v The Case- Law of the Court of Justice on Family Reunification 
Law Abuse
The first case of the Court of Justice that mentioned the possibility that law 
may be abused in the context of family reunification was Surinder Singh.110 
In this case, the Court recognized the possibility that relying on family reuni-
fication rules, in the context of free movement, can constitute abuse of law 
and that Member States can act against it. It considered: “the facilities created 
 107 Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 297 et seq.
 108 Akrich, cit., para. 57.
 109 Boeles, P., Den Heijer, M., Lodder, G., and Wouters, K. (2014). European Migration Law, cit., 
p. 63; Costello, C. (2011). Citizenship of the Union, cit., p. 321 et seq.
 110 The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State 
for Home Department, cit. This case took place before Directive 2004/ 38 was adopted. 
Hence, there was no general legislative provision for abuse yet. It may even be per-
ceived that Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38, cit., is a codification of this aspect of Surinder 
Singh. Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 298; 
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by the Treaty cannot have the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from 
them to evade the application of national legislation and of prohibiting Mem-
ber States from taking the measures necessary to prevent such abuse”.111 The 
Court did not yet specify what types of behaviour could constitute such abuse. 
Instead, it created the possibility for the use of EU law to circumvent national 
family reunification rules, by establishing that once a family member acquires 
a residence right in the host state, where an EU citizen resides, he is able to 
retain these rights upon return to the home state of the EU citizen, which was 
discussed above. Years later, the Surinder Singh exception to the purely inter-
nal situation was confirmed in Akrich, Eind, Metock and in O. and B. and con-
tinues to be applicable law.112 How does the possibility to apply this U- turn 
construction in the field of family reunification relate to the general doctrine 
on abuse of law? Can it be considered to be abuse of law, and if yes, under 
which circumstances?113
Akrich was a first test- case in the context of free movement and family reuni-
fication and involved a British- Moroccan couple who applied the U- turn con-
struction to legalize the residence status of the Moroccan spouse. To achieve 
this, the couple moved to Ireland where the British spouse took up a temporary 
job, entitling the Moroccan partner to a residence right. When they wanted to 
return to the UK, they admitted that the only reason they moved to Ireland was 
to acquire a residence right for the Moroccan spouse on the basis of EU law. 
 111 The Queen v.  Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of 
State for Home Department, cit., para. 24; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the 
European Union, cit., p. 101.
 112 The Queen v.  Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of 
State for Home Department, cit.; Akrich, cit.; Eind, cit.; Metock and Others, cit.; O. and B., 
cit.; Coman and Others, cit.; Altiner and Ravn, cit.; Banger, cit.; Guild, E., Peers, S., and 
Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 58 et seq.; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse 
Discrimination in the European Union, cit., pp.  101– 114; Tryfonidou, A.  (2009). Reverse 
Discrimination in EC Law, cit., pp. 103– 106.
 113 must also be noted that Art. 35, on abuse, was not in the original legislative proposal 
of the Commission and was added by the Council in a later stage of the negotiations 
(Council Common Position (EC) 6/ 2004 of 5 December 2003 adopted by the Council, act-
ing in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, with a view to adopting a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, statement of reasons on 
Art. 35). Although the Court had identified the issue of abuse before, it appears that its 
assertion by the Council was mainly symbolic, as a manifestation of their sovereignty, and 
they had not thought through which cases aside from marriages of convenience could 
constitute abuse. It is, thus, logical that this question arose later. Guild, E., Peers, S., and 
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The Court considered that when an EU citizen “pursues or wishes to pursue an 
effective and genuine activity”,114 this cannot constitute an abuse within the 
meaning of the Surinder Singh judgment. “If there is a genuine exercise of an 
economic activity as defined by the Court of Justice, its preconditions cannot 
at the same time be created artificially”.115 Moreover, for the evaluation of the 
nature of the activity that is pursued, “the motives […] are of no account […] 
nor are [they] relevant in assessing the legal situation of the couple at the time 
of their return to the Member State of which the worker is a national”.116 The 
Court, thus, seemed to deviate from the two- step abuse of law test that was 
formulated in Emsland- Stärke because, in Akrich, the subjective element of 
this test had become inoperative.117 At the same time, the subjective element 
of the test was hollowed in Halifax and would be hollowed even further in Cad-
bury Schweppes, a couple of years after Akrich. Did the Court in Akrich deviate 
from its standing practice by completely excluding the relevance of motive to 
establish abuse of law in the context of free movement law? Or should the 
Court’s leniency in this case be attributed to the general development of the 
EU’s case law on abuse of law, in which the subjective element of the two- step 
abuse test from Emsland- Stärke was declining anyway?
It followed from Akrich that the use of free movement law to acquire the 
rights that are attached to it cannot be qualified as abuse, as long as the use 
of these rights is effective and genuine. This criterion is derived from the 
case- law on free movement of workers, which is laid down in Art. 45 tfeu. In 
Lawrie- Blum, the Court reiterated that the concept of a “worker” should have 
a communitarian meaning to avoid discrepancies in interpretation among the 
Member States. One of the criteria to qualify as a worker under EU law is that 
the provided services are effective and genuine and rewarded with a remu-
neration.118 When the exercise of free movement rights is effective and genu-
ine, there cannot be an abuse of EU law.119 By defining a broad scope for free 
 114 In Akrich, cit., para. 55 (emphasis added).
 115 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 305 et seq.
 116 Akrich, cit. paras 55– 56; Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J.  (2014). The EU Citizenship 
Directive, cit., pp. 59, 298; Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, 
cit., p. 102.
 117 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 305 et seq.
 118 Lawrie- Blum v. Land Baden- Wüttemberg, cit., para. 21; Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in 
the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., p. 300 et seq.; Barnard, C. (2013). The 
Substantive Law of the EU, cit., p. 240.
 119 Levin v.  Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., para. 23; Akrich, cit., para. 55; Ziegler, K.S. 
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movement law, the Member States do not have much leeway to invoke abuse 
of law to annul the rights that are attached to having the status of a worker 
in EU law.120 The circumvention of national law is permitted, provided that 
the use of EU law is genuine and effective. The Court did not clarify, however, 
under what circumstances the use of free movement right is genuine and ef-
fective, and when it is not.
The shift in the Court’s approach is in line with the development of its case- 
law more generally. The focus on genuine use of EU law is understandable in 
the light of the principle of effectiveness, which precludes easy derogation 
from EU law by the Member States. A  narrow construction of abuse of law 
fits these principles because otherwise, Member States could rely on abuse of 
law to undermine EU law. The increasing role of fundamental rights protection 
in the EU is also reflected in the Court’s case- law. A narrow understanding of 
abuse of law benefits certainty about their rights and future. Maybe that is why 
the Court first relied on a sole purpose approach to abuse of law in the context 
of free movement and family reunification law.
vi The Commission Communication with Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Directive 2004/ 38
A few years after the adoption of Directive 2004/ 38, the European Commis-
sion undertook an investigation into the implementation of the Directive in 
the Member States, which showed that uniformity was lacking and that much 
ambiguity still existed about the obligations it imposes.121 To remedy the faulty 
implementation, the European Commission drafted its guidelines “for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/ 38”.122
seq.; Barnard, C. (2013). The Substantive Law of the EU, cit. p. 241. The question is raised, 
however, how the Court came up with the criterion of a genuine use of EU law, consid-
ering that it does not appear anywhere in the Treaties or in Directive 2004/ 38, see: Nic 
Shuibhne, N. (2014). The “Constitutional Weight” of Adjectives. European Law Review 39 
(2), pp. 153– 154, 154.
 120 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, cit., 
p. 297.
 121 Report of 10 December 2008 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, com(2008) 840 final.
 122 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit.; Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The 
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The Communication recites the general principle that “Community law 
cannot be relied on in case of abuse”.123 Nevertheless,
[EU] law promotes the mobility of EU citizens and protects those who 
have made use of it. There is no abuse where EU citizens and their fam-
ily members obtain a right of residence under [EU] law in a Member 
State other than that of the EU citizen’s nationality as they are benefiting 
from an advantage inherent in the exercise of the right of free movement 
protected by the Treaty, regardless of the purpose of their move to that 
State.124
The sole purpose doctrine which the Court developed in Akrich and subse-
quent case- law is clearly recognizable.
The Communication continues with a description of what behaviour could 
constitute abuse of law. Pursuant to the text of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38, it 
starts with the definition of marriages of convenience. “Recital 28 defines mar-
riages of convenience for the purpose of the Directive as marriages contract-
ed for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence 
under the Directive that someone would not have otherwise”.125 Nevertheless, 
when the marriage is genuine, it “cannot be considered as a marriage of con-
venience simply because it brings an immigration advantage, or indeed any 
other advantage”.126 Neither is the quality of the relationship decisive for the 
application of Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38. Analogously, other relationships 
that came into being “for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free move-
ment and residence” can be the subject of national measures to combat abuse, 
such as a (registered) partnership of convenience or the adoption or recogni-
tion of a child with the sole purpose to rely on the free movement legislation 
to acquire a residence right.127 On the other hand, the Commission recalls that 
“[m] easures taken by Member States to fight against marriages of convenience 
may not be such as to deter EU citizens and their family members from mak-
ing use of their right to free movement or unduly encroach on their legitimate 
 123 Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, cit.; The Queen v. Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department, cit.; 
Centros, cit.
 124 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 15.
 125 Ibid., p. 15.
 126 Ibid.
 127 Verhellen, J.  (2016). Schijnerkenningen:  Internationale Families Opnieuw in de 
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rights. They must not undermine the effectiveness of Community law or dis-
criminate on grounds of nationality”.128
Subsequently, a set of indicative criteria is given that can be used to deter-
mine whether there is an abuse of EU law. Among these are the duration of the 
relationship, whether the spouses share a common language, their knowledge 
about each other, the existence of long- term commitments such as concluding 
a mortgage and cohabitation – although it follows from the Court’s case- law 
that cohabitation is not a requirement to qualify for a residence right on the 
basis of family reunification.129 Member States must give due attention to all 
circumstances of the individual case and may not base a decision on one single 
element of the situation.130 The Commission omits to support these instruc-
tions with reference to case- law. Nevertheless, several elements are recogniz-
able. The instructions are clearly based on the sole purpose doctrine that is 
developed by the Court.131 The genuine nature of the marriage is decisive, re-
gardless of whether it brings any advantage to the spouses. The unimportance 
of the quality of the relationship for the classification of abuse, furthermore, 
follows from the case- law in Diatta and Ogieriakhi.132 The amplification to oth-
er relationships of convenience, on the other hand, seems to be an addition by 
the Commission itself. In 2014, the Commission renewed the instructions on 
 128 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p.  15. It is notable that marriages of conve-
nience are only annulled when they are concluded for a migration purpose. The legality 
of marriages concluded for tax advantages, housing advantages, or any other reason out-
side of reciprocal affection, on the other hand, is never disputed.
 129 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 February 1985, case 267/ 83, Diatta v. Land Berlin, para. 15; 
judgment of 10 July 2014, case C- 244/ 13, Ogieriakhi, para. 37.
 130 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 16 et seq.; McCarthy, cit.
 131 Applying the sole- purpose approach also corresponds with the rights that are laid down 
in the Family Reunification Directive 2003/ 86 which is applicable to family members of 
third- country nationals legally residing in the EU. Art. 16, para, 2, let. b), gives Member 
States the possibility to reject, withdraw, or refuse residence to a family member, when 
the marriage was “contracted for the sole purpose of enabling the person concerned to 
enter or reside in a Member State” (emphasis added). According to the Court in Metock 
and Others, cit. it would be paradoxical if Directive 2004/ 38 would not minimally offer 
the same protection as Directive 2003/ 86. In this light it makes sense to assume that if a 
residence right derived from Directive 2003/ 86 is only annulled when the marriage that 
brought about that entitlement was concluded for the sole purpose of acquiring a resi-
dence title, the same rule can be applied to residence rights derived from Directive 2004/ 
38. Following this logic, these residence rights can only be annulled when the marriage 
that brought about this entitlement was concluded for that sole purpose. Even though, 
remarkably, Art. 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 itself does not provide a definition of a marriage 
of convenience.
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the consequences of marriages of convenience in the “Handbook on address-
ing the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between EU citizens and 
non- EU nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of EU citizens”. 
This handbook mostly contains the same principles and instructions which 
were included in the Commission Communication of 2009.133
In addition, according to the Commission,
[a] buse could also occur when EU citizens, unable to be joined by their 
third country family members in their Member State of origin because 
of the application of national immigration rules preventing it, move to 
another Member State with the sole purpose to evade, upon returning to 
their home Member State, the national law that frustrated their family 
reunification efforts, invoking their rights under [EU] law. The defining 
characteristics of the line between genuine and abusive use of [EU] law 
should be based on the assessment of whether the exercise of [EU] rights 
in a Member State from which the EU citizens and their family mem-
ber(s) return was genuine and effective.134
Once again, the codification of the Court’s case- law in Akrich, Levin, and 
Lawrie- Blum, which were discussed in the above, is apparent, as well as the 
applicability of the sole purpose approach to abuse in family reunification law. 
Genuine use of EU rights can never constitute abuse of law, regardless of the 
purpose for which the rights are used. If a planned circumvention of national 
immigration law is realized through such genuine use of EU rights, the circum-
vention is legitimate.
The assessment of whether the use of EU law is genuine and effective “can 
only be made on a case- by- case basis” and can be carried out on the basis of 
another set of criteria provided by the Commission Communication. Previous 
unsuccessful attempts to acquire residence for a third- country spouse under 
national law can be taken into account, as well as efforts made to establish 
in the host Member State, including national registration formalities and se-
curing accommodation, enrolling children at an educational establishment 
and acquiring a job. Also here, due attention must be paid to all the relevant 
 133 Communication com(2014) 604 of 26 September 2014 from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on helping national authorities fight abuses of the 
right to free movement: Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of con-
venience between EU citizens and non- EU nationals in the context of EU law on free 
movement of EU citizens.
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circumstances and a decision may not be based on one single element of the 
case.135 Moreover, “[i] t cannot be inferred that the residence in the host Mem-
ber State is not genuine and effective only because an EU citizen maintains 
some ties to the home Member State […] [and] [t]he mere fact that a person 
consciously places himself in a situation conferring a right does not in itself 
constitute a sufficient basis for assuming that there is abuse”.136
Lastly, the Communication mentions that “the Directive must be interpret-
ed and applied in accordance with fundamental rights […] as guaranteed in 
the European Convention of Human Rights (echr) and as reflected in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights”.137 And that investigations into alleged abuse 
situations “must be carried out in accordance with fundamental rights, in par-
ticular with Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 12 (right 
to marry) of the echr (Articles 7 and 9 of the EU Charter)”.138 In the light of 
this obligation and the interest of the families involved to live together with 
their loved ones, it is sequacious that abuse of law is interpreted narrowly and 
in accordance with the sole purpose approach.139 Families thus enjoy more 
certainty about their rights and about their future.
vii Defining Genuine Use of EU Law – O. and B.
In the years after Akrich and the publiction of the Commission Communi-
cation, the Court of Justice was relatively silent on the doctrine of abuse of 
law in the context of family reunification,140 until 2014, when O. and B. was 
handed down.141 In this case, the Court reiterated its abuse of law doctrine and 
 considered:
[T] he scope of Union law cannot be extended to cover abuses […]. Proof 
of such an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances 
in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the 
European Union rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved, 
 135 Ibid., p. 18– 19.
 136 Ibid., p. 18, with reference to Centros, cit., para. 27.
 137 Ibid., p. 3; Metock and Others, cit., para. 79.
 138 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 17.
 139 See supra.
 140 Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 60 et seq; Eind, 
cit.; Metock and Others, cit.; O. and B., cit.
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and, secondly, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain 
an advantage from the European Union rules by artificially creating the 
conditions laid down for obtaining it.142
The Court, thus, re- established the Emsland- Stärke test to determine whether 
there is an abuse of law but also reiterated that there can only be abuse when 
the conditions under which a right is obtained are wholly artificial, which fol-
lowed from Cadbury Schweppes.143
In O. and B., the Court clarified the condition that residence in the host Mem-
ber State must have been effective and genuine before rights can be retained in 
a return situation. Effective and genuine exercise of EU rights requires:
to settle in the host Member State in a way which would be such as to cre-
ate or strengthen family life in that Member State […]. [A] Union citizen 
who exercises his rights under Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/ 38 does not 
intend to settle in the host Member State […]. […] Residence in the host 
Member State pursuant to and in conformity with the con ditions set out 
in Article 7(1) of that directive is, in principle, evidence of settling there 
and therefore of the Union citizen’s genuine residence in the host Mem-
ber State and goes hand in hand with creating and strengthening family 
life in that Member State.144
A distinction is made between short- term travel and long- term settling in the 
host Member State in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38. This provi-
sion determines that “[a] ll Union citizens shall have the right of residence on 
the territory of another Member State for a period of longer than three months 
if they” qualify as a worker, selfemployed, economically not active with suffi-
cient resources or as a student. The text of this provision seems to imply that Art. 
7 can only be applicable after a minimum of three months of residence. O. and 
B. was, therefore, understood as the introduction of a requirement of a three 
months residence in the host- state, before a family member’s residence right 
can be retained upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen.145  
 142 O. and B., cit.; para. 58 with reference to Emsland- Stärke, cit., para. 52; Bozkurt, cit., para. 
47; Hungary v. Slovakia, cit., para. 58.
 143 Emsland- Stärke, cit.; Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppers Overseas, cit.
 144 O. and B., cit., paras. 52– 53.
 145 Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 303; Verbist, 
V.  (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p.  110 et seq.; Van Eijken, 
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Such an interpretation means that the genuineness of the exercise of free 
movement rights is made dependent on a set period of three months of res-
idence. However, is it sensible to link duration of residence with its genuine-
ness in itself? And – if it is installed anyway – how can a minimum period of 
residence be determined for the use of rights to be genuine, without being 
inevitably arbitrary in posing this condition? “Why can a Union citizen who 
has lived for 3.5 months in another Member State, in which he met his partner 
be joined by her when he returns to this Member State of origin and why is 
this not possible for the Union citizen who visits another Member State for a 
period of many consecutive years?”.146 It seems hard to accept that the period 
of residence is decisive in itself for residence to be genuine, rather than being 
one of the relevant criteria to decide so.147
This contribution proposes a different interpretation of O. and B. Article 6 of 
Directive 2004/ 38 provides the right to visit any Member State for up to three 
months, without the need to fulfil any conditions to exercise that right. Art. 7 
of Directive 2004/ 38 provides the right to reside in another Member State for a 
period of longer than three months when certain criteria are fulfilled. Accord-
ingly, when an EU citizen wishes to have a right to reside in the territory of an-
other Member States for a period of longer than three months, he must comply 
with the criteria in Art. 7. That does not mean that an individual cannot rely on 
Art. 7 and reside in a Member State in accordance with the criteria in that pro-
vision before those three months elapse. Any other conclusion would imply 
that exercising the rights derived from Art. 6 for three months is a precondition 
to rely on Art. 7 and to register at the municipality of residence. This is not the 
case. Such a condition is not included in Directive 2004/ 38 and would also be 
very difficult to enforce. As a result, it is already possible from the first day of 
arrival to register as a resident in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38. 
Does this mean that even one day of residence in conformity with Art. 7 would 
already be sufficient to derive family reunification rights in the host Member 
State and upon return in the home Member State of the EU citizen?148 And 
a family who resides in the host Member State for much longer than three 
months without complying with the conditions in Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, 
12 O. and B. and C- 457/ 12 S. and G.: Clarifying the Inter- State Requirement for EU Citizens? 
European Law Blog, available at europeanlawblog.eu.
 146 Verbist, V. (2017). Reverse Discrimination in the European Union, cit., p. 112.
 147 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 12 December 2013, joined cases C- 456/ 12 and C- 
457/ 12, O. and B. and S. and G., para. 111.
 148 Although such a claim would give difficulty in regard of proving the existence of that right 
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on the other hand, would be deprived of the rights provided by the directive 
in the host state and after return in the EU citizen’s home Member State?149
Considering the Court’s wording, it seems that the decisive criterion to re-
tain a residence right upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen 
is not the duration of residence but whether residence in the host state is “such 
as to create or strengthen family life in that Member State”, which should be 
assessed on a case- by- case basis. Three months of residence in the host Mem-
ber State in accordance with the conditions in Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38 could 
then be used as a presumption of having created or strengthened family life, 
rather than as a precondition. This interpretation is in line with the Court’s 
wording in O. and B., in which it considered that “[r] esidence in the host Mem-
ber State pursuant to and in conformity with the conditions set out in Article 
7(1) of that directive […] goes hand in hand with creating and strengthening 
family life in that Member State”.150 Thus, creation and strengthening of family 
life is presumed when there is a three months residence that is in conformity 
with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, but this does not exclude the possibility that 
a period of less than three months could also create or strengthen family life, 
provided that the residence is still exercised in conformity with Art. 7 of the 
Directive. This approach would allow for real case- by- case assessment of the 
use of rights, which, aside from the duration of residence, could take other 
parameters into account including cohabitation, intensity of the contact and 
the duration of the relationship. Residence for more than three months would 
not automatically lead to the retention of residence rights but would need to 
be complemented with other evidence that family life was created or strength-
ened. In addition, residence for less than three months would not automatical-
ly lead to the denial of the retention of residence rights but would need to be 
compensated with other evidence that family life was created or strengthened 
to be entitled to those rights. This reading furthermore excludes the possibil-
ity that a simple one day visit across the border would be sufficient to rely on 
the Court’s case- law for return situations, which fits the objectives of EU law. 
Family reunification rights and the continuation thereof are meant to facilitate 
free movement, and this free movement is not hindered if family can not be 
brought for a single day visit to another Member State.
The proposed reading of O. and B. is further supported by a more recent case 
of the Court of Justice, which stems from 2018. Altiner and Ravn was about a 
Danish- Turkish couple who resided in Sweden for a couple of years. During 
 149 Spaventa, E. (2015). Family Rights for Circular Migrants and Frontier Workers, cit., p. 769 
et seq.
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this time, Altiner’s Turkish son visited them twice for a total period of about 
3,5 months with a valid Schengen visa, and stayed with them. When Ravn and 
Altiner returned to Denmark, the son applied for a residence permit as a family 
member of a Danish citizen in a return situation. Between their return and the 
son’s application was a time window of little less than nine months. His re-
quest was denied, because according to the Danish authorities, his application 
was not ‘a natural consequence’ of Ms Ravn’s return to Denmark. The author-
ities did not take a position on the question of whether the stay of the son in 
Sweden had created or strengthened family life between him and Ms Ravn.151 
The national court therefore asked the Court of Justice whether the Member 
State may require that the entry of a family member is a ‘natural consequence’ 
of the Union citizen’s return?152
In answering the preliminary question, the Court considered that it ‘is true 
that it is the genuine residence [in accordance with Article 7(1) and (2) of Di-
rective 2004/ 38] of the Union citizen and of the family member who is a third- 
country national in the host Member State which creates, on the return of that 
Union citizen to the Member State of which he is a national, a derived right of 
residence on the basis of Article 21(1) tfeu for the third- country national with 
whom that citizen has live as a family in the host Member State’.153 The Court 
of Justice then recalls that to obtain a derived residence right in the host Mem-
ber State, it is not relevant at what time the family member joins the EU citi-
zen, so an elapse of time between the arrival of the EU citizen and his family 
member should not stand in the way of family reunification.154 The residence 
right that is granted in the Member State of origin of the EU citizen is, how-
ever, different in nature, and is meant to continue family life which has been 
created or strengthened in the host Member State. If this family life has been 
interrupted before the entry of the third- country national into the Member 
State of which the EU citizen is a national, this may affect the residence right 
in that Member State. Member States are allowed to verify whether such an 
interruption exists, and for that purpose they may take into account that the 
third- country national family member entered the territory of the EU citizen’s 
home Member State a significant period of time after that citizen’s return to 
 151 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 10– 14. For an analysis of this case see in this volume De Groot, 
D.A. Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens; Oosterom- Staples, H. (2018). Noot bij HvJ EU 27 
juni 2018, zaak C- 230/ 17 (Altiner en Ravn) en HvJ EU 12 juli 2018, zaak C- 246/ 17 (Banger). 
Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 22 (11).
 152 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 18.
 153 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 20 and 26.
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that territory. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that a family life, created 
or strengthened between a Union citizen and a third- country national family 
member in the host Member State might continue despite the fact that the EU 
citizen has returned to the Member State of which she is a national without 
being accompanied by the family member in question, who may have been 
obliged, for reasons relating to his personal situation, profession or education, 
to delay his arrival in the home Member State of the EU citizen.155
The Court concluded that the decisive criterion for a continuation of rights 
would be the existence of a link between the application for a residence right 
and the exercise by that citizen of his freedom of movement, which should 
be assessed as such. The fact that the submission of the application for a res-
idence permit was not ‘a natural consequence’ of the return of the EU citizen 
is a relevant, but not a decisive factor in this assessment. Hence, the national 
authorities are allowed to weigh the question whether the application of the 
family member is ‘a natural consequence’ of the return of the EU citizen to the 
Member State of which he is a national, provided that other factors are also 
taken into account in the context of an overall assessment. This assessment 
should particularly take account of factors that are capable of showing that 
family life created and strengthened in the host Member State has not ended, 
in spite of the time which elapsed between the return of the Union citizen to 
that Member State and the entry of her third- country national family mem-
ber. If family life continues to exist, this would justify the acknowledgment 
of a derived right of residence in the home Member State of the EU citizen to 
continue family life that was created or strengthened in the host Member State 
during the period of residence that was spend there.156
Altiner and Ravn confirms the conclusion that was derived from O.  and 
B. The decisive criterion to retain a derived residence right for a family mem-
ber of an EU citizen after a period of residence in another Member State is the 
existence of family life that was created or strengthened in the host Member 
State and continuated after the return to the EU citizen’s home Member State. 
All other circumstances, such as the moment in time when the family mem-
ber enters the Member State, or the period of residence of the EU citizen in 
the host Member State (provided that this residence was in accordance with 
Article 7 of Directive 2004/ 38), are relevant to be taken into account as part 
of the overall assessment of the creation, strengthening and continuation of 
family life in the home Member State. These factors cannot, however, be used 
 155 Altiner and Ravn, cit., para. 30– 33.
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as fixed criteria on the basis of which an automatically generated decision on 
the legality of residence after return is issued.
viii Abuse v. Non- Applicability of EU Law
Considering the abuse of law doctrine and the case- law of the Court in the 
field of family reunification, the question arises how abuse of law can be dis-
tinguished from the lack of fulfilment for the conditions of a right.157 In O. and 
B., the Court reiterated the Member States’ competence to combat abuse of 
law but it did not link abuse of law to the non- fulfilment of the criterion to 
have created or strengthened family life in the host Member State. Rather, it 
formulated a condition for the possibility to rely on Directive 2004/ 38 by anal-
ogy for family reunification after return to the home Member State. When this 
condition is not fulfilled, it is not a matter of abuse of EU law but a matter of 
non- compliance with the conditions for retaining a residence right in the EU 
citizen’s home Member State after his return. In that case there is no entitle-
ment to a right, so there cannot be an abuse of rights either. Mutatis mutandis, 
when the conditions for family reunification are fulfilled, there is a right to 
family reunification which cannot be considered to be abuse, even if national 
law was circumvented.158
When considering the difference between failing to fulfill the applicable 
conditions to retain a residence right and abuse of law, there is a difference 
between marriages of convenience and the Europe- route. When national law 
is circumvented, it depends on the circumstances of the case whether it can be 
classified as abuse or not. When a marriage of convenience is discovered, on 
the other hand, then Article 35 of Directive 2004/ 38 automatically labels this 
practice as an abuse.159 Even then, however, the question about the distinction 
between non- applicability and abuse can be raised. Annulment of a marriage 
means that there was never a family relationship.160 Since the rights that are 
granted by Directive 2004/ 38 are declaratory, this annulment implies that the 
conditions for family reunification were never fulfilled and the residence right 
 157 Ziegler, K.S. (2011). Abuse of Law in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers, 
cit., p. 296; Spaventa, E. (2011). Comments on Abuse of Law and the Free Movement of 
Workers. In: De La Feria and Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of Abuse of Law, cit., pp. 315– 320; 
Guild, E., Peers, S., and Tomkin, J. (2014). The EU Citizenship Directive, cit., p. 310.
 158 Communication com(2009) 313 final, cit., p. 15.
 159 Akrich, cit.; McCarthy, cit.
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never existed in the first place. Consequently, the residence right would not be 
withdrawn on the basis of abuse of law, but because Directive 2004/ 38 would 
simply not be applicable. This reading of Directive 2004/ 38 is problematic, 
because it positions the withdrawal or termination of a residence right that 
results from the discovery of a marriage of convenience outside the scope of 
EU law altogether, which takes away the obligation to take account of the pro-
cedural safeguards which the directive provides. The mere existence of Article 
35 of Directive 2004/ 38 opposes this view, because it provides that the termi-
nation or withdrawal of a residence right due to the discovery of a marriage of 
convenience should take place in accordance with the safeguards the directive 
provides for. It is thus suggested that the conclusion of a marriage of conve-
nience and the pursuant – faulty – recognition of a residence right precludes 
the existence of this right ex tunc but still brings the situation within the scope 
of Directive 2004/ 38. The national measures to withdraw the residence right 
should, therefore, be taken in accordance with Art. 35 of the Directive.161 This 
means that safeguards of proportionality should be applied,162 which are not 
applicable if the withdrawal of a residence right would fall outside the scope of 
the Directive altogether.163 In that case, the only safeguard that would still be 
available for the third- country national who lost his residence right is found in 
general international law, most notably in Art. 8 echr. As was mentioned ear-
lier, the de facto protection of residence by Art. 8 echr is limited because its 
basic premise is very different than under EU law. Art. 8 echr departs from the 
 161 This reading of Directive 2004/ 38 corresponds with the rights that are laid down in 
Directive 2003/ 86, which is applicable to family members of third- country nationals 
legally residing in the EU. In accordance with Art. 17 of Directive 2003/ 86, residence 
rights can only be rejected, withdrawn or refused when due account is taken of the per-
sonal circumstances of the person concerned and a proportionality assessment is carried 
out. Directive 2004/ 38 should minimally offer the same protection as Directive 2003/ 86 
(Metock and Others, cit., para. 69). Thus, withdrawal of a residence right that was con-
ferred upon the third- country national through concluding a marriage of convenience, 
should be subject to the procedural safeguards in Directive 2004/ 38 as well.
 162 Arts 30– 31 of Directive 2004/ 38., cit.
 163 A distinction is made between non- existence of a right and non- applicability of the 
Directive, and national authorities may struggle with the distinction. In Belgium, for 
instance, there is a divergence in responses to the discovery of a marriage of convenience. 
Some decisions place the withdrawal of residence rights derived from Directive 2004/ 
38 outside the scope of the Directive and the implementing law (Vreemdelingenwet), 
while other decisions do apply the safeguards in the law that implements the Directive. 
See Kroeze, H.H.C. (2018). De Link Tussen Familierecht en Europees Migratierecht: De 
Route van de Vernietiging van een Schijnhuwelijk naar de Intrekking van Verblijfsrecht. 
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authority of the Member States to decide on the entry of non- nationals into 
their territory.164 Only when there are strong social and family ties in the Mem-
ber State of residence non- admission or expulsion breaches the immigrant’s 
right to family life.165 To determine whether this is the case, a balance must 
be struck between the interest of the State and the interest of the individual. 
Art. 8 echr may provide a safety net for residence for those who fall outside 
the scope of EU law, but this does not compensate the loss of procedural rights 
that would be enjoyed on the basis of Directive 2004/ 38.166
A similar reasoning can be used for an EU citizen and his family member 
who want to rely on Directive 2004/ 38 in a return situation but fail to comply 
with the criterion of creating or strengthening family life in the host Mem-
ber State before their return. If the criteria in O. and B. are considered to be 
a threshold for the applicability of EU law, noncompliance with those crite-
ria results in non- applicability of EU law. Classifying reliance on the case- law 
of the Court in Surinder Singh and O. and B. when the condition to create or 
strengthen family life is not fulfilled as a form of abuse of law, on the other 
hand, does trigger the applicability and the procedural safeguards of Art. 35 
of Directive 2004/ 38. In that case, the refusal of a residence right must be pro-
portionate and must observe the procedural requirements in the Directive.167 
Hence, it seems in the interest of the involved families in cases of marriages 
of convenience and in return situations to apply the concept of abuse, rather 
than conclude that Directive 2004/ 38 is not applicable. Because if Directive 
2004/ 38 is not applicable, the implication is that a situation is purely internal 
to the Member State and falls outside the scope of EU law. As was explained 
above, in that case only Art. 8 echr is left to provide protection and safeguards 
against expulsion or non- admission, but to qualify for residence under this 
provision is a high threshold. When a situation is qualified as abuse of rights, 
on the other hand, it comes within the scope of EU law and is, therefore, no 
longer a purely internal situation. As a result, safeguards derived from EU law 
are applicable before a residence right can be refused or withdrawn, for the 
better of the families involved.
 164 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, cit., para. 67; Rodrigues da Silva 
and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, cit., para. 39; Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit., para. 107.
 165 E.g., Sen v. the Netherlands, cit.; Tuquabo- Tekle et al v. the Netherlands, cit.
 166 E.g., Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, cit.; Thym, D. (2008). Respect for Private and Family Life 
Under Article 8 echr in Immigration Cases, cit., p. 87 et seq.; Van Elsuwege, P. and Adam, 
S.  (2017). EU Citizenship and the European Federal Challenge Through the Prism of 
Family Reunification, cit., pp. 443– 467; Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). The Substance of Rights, cit.
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ix Personal Scope of Family Life
If the possibility to derive a residence right in a return situation is defined 
by the question whether family life was created or strengthened during the 
exercise of free movement rights abroad, the next question is which family 
members are eligible to have a family life with.168 This question is particularly 
relevant, because Member States have different practices concerning which 
family members they entitle for family reunification, and with regard to the 
recognition of family relationships that originated in other (Member) States. 
Recently, a few cases provided new insights on this matter.
In Banger, the Court of Justice ruled on the question whether the possibility 
to retain a residence right in a return situation also applies to the partner with 
whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, when the Member State 
of the Union citizen does not grant family reunification to the unmarried and 
unregistered partner.169 The case at hand was about Mr. Rado, a UK nation-
al, who had resided in the Netherlands with his South- African partner, Mrs. 
Banger, and now wished to return to the UK with her. The Court considered 
that in principle, Directive 2004/ 38 does not require the Member States to ad-
mit the partner of an EU citizen with whom he enjoys a durable relationship. 
The Court’s case- law on return situations, however, should be applied without 
any reservations.170 Thus, even though the UK lacks a right to family reunifica-
tion between EU citizens and the partner with whom they have a durable re-
lationship, it is still obliged to recognize the validity of this relationship under 
EU law, for the purpose of deriving a residence right from EU law in a return 
situation.171
Coman was about the return of a Romanian national from Belgium to his 
home Member State, who wanted to be accompanied by his husband – a US 
 168 Another question that is relevant in the context of family reunification derived from exer-
cising free movement rights in return situations and in general, concerns the applicability 
of EU law on citizens with multiple EU nationalities. If such an individual moves between 
two Member States of which he is a national, is he eligible for family reunification rights 
in both countries or in neither of them? And is it possible to rely on the Court’s doctrine 
about return situations after having resided in a Member State of which the EU citizen is 
also a national? The current chapter does not elaborate on this issue, but David de Groot 
does discuss these questions in the contribution he added to this volume: Free Movement 
of Dual EU Citizens.
 169 Banger, cit., para. 19. For an analysis on this case see Oosterom- Staples, H. (2018). Noot bij 
HvJ EU 27 juni 2018, zaak C- 230/ 17 (Altiner en Ravn) en HvJ EU 12 juli 2018, zaak C- 246/ 17 
(Banger), cit.
 170 Banger, cit., para. 24- 34.
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citizen. Romania refused the application, because it does not recognize gay 
marriages, and therefore excluded the couple from the applicability of EU 
free movement law after Coman’s return. The Romanian Constiutional Court 
referred the case to the Court of Justice to ask whether this practice was in 
accordance with EU law.172 The Court of Justice reiterated the possibility to re-
tain residence rights of an EU citizen’s family member after the EU citizen has 
exercised his free movement rights and then returns to his Member State of 
origin. It then dealt with the question whether same- sex spouses are included 
within the personal scope of these rights, which are awarded under the condi-
tions that are set by Directive 2004/ 38, which applies by analogy. In doing so, 
it observed that the term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/ 38 is 
gender- netural and may therefore cover the same- sex spouse of the Union cit-
izen concerned. This reading is furthermore supported by the fact that spouse 
is a communitarian concept, for the interpretation of which no reference is 
made to the Member State legislation. Therefore, Member States cannot rely 
on their national laws to refuse a residence right to the same- sex spouse of 
an EU citizen that is derived from EU law. It is therefore bound to recognize 
the marriages concluded in another Member State.173 This obligation does not 
impose an obligation for the Member States to provide for the possibility of 
same- sex marriages in their national family law, which is a competence of each 
Member State. Nevertheless, the exercise of those competences is limited by 
the obligations that stem from EU law. Most notably, Member States should 
ensure freedom of movement for all EU citizens, and acknowledge the rights 
that are attached to exercising this freedom.174
Both cases oblige the Member State to acknowledge a residence right to 
family members of EU citizens, who they do not recognize as family members 
in their national law. In Banger, a residence right was awarded to the partner 
in a durable relationhip with the returning UK national who exercised his free 
movement rights, even though the UK does not grant this right to its own cit-
izens or to EU citizens residing in the UK, and neither does EU law impose 
that obligation. Yet, rights that were acquired in another Member State should 
 172 Coman, cit., para. 9– 12 and 17. For an analysis on this case see Tryfonidou, A.  (2018). 
Free Movement of Same- sex Spouses Within the EU:  The ecj’s Coman Judgment, cit.; 
Kroeze, H.H.C., and Safradin, B. (2019). Een Overwinning voor vrij Verkeersrechten van 
Regenboogfamilies in Europa: Het Langverwachte Coman Arrest, cit.; Kochenov, D., and 
Belavusau, U. (2019). Same- sex spouses in the EU after Coman: More free movement, but 
what about marriage? EUI Department of Law Research Paper 2019.
 173 Coman, cit., para. 29– 36.
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be preserved, despite national policy choices that would indicate otherwise.175 
In the light of constitutional EU law this case- law of the Court is not surpris-
ing and seems to be connected to the principle of mutual recognition.176 If a 
durable relationship is recognized in one Member State as eligible to enjoy a 
residence right, the other Member States must recognize the rights that are 
derived thereof, which is an affluent of the principles of effectiveness and loyal 
cooperation.177 The same goes for the residence right of the same- sex spouse 
of an EU citizen who created or strengthened family life with that spouse in 
another Member State and then returns to his home Member State as in Co-
man. The case- law is understandable from a European constitutional perspec-
tive and fits the internal market logic of mutual recognition, but it does have 
a serious impact on the family law and private international law competences 
of the Member States.
Under international law and private international law, states have the com-
petence to decide which family relationships they recognize. Mutatis mutan-
dis, if a state does not recognize gay marriage, or it does not attach any legal 
consequences to a durable relationship between unmarried partners, it is with-
in its discretion to allow or disallow access to its territory and to attach rights 
to these personal status or not. The discussed case- law reduces this compe-
tence by dictating that for the purpose of deriving rights form EU law, certain 
relationships must be recognized, regardless of the recognition of these rela-
tionships in the national law of the Member State. In Coman, Member States 
opposed this approach, and argued that Member States should be allowed to 
refuse a residence right to a family member that is not recognized as such un-
der their national law, on the basis of objective public- interest considerations 
 175 It is asserted here that the obligation for the Member States to recognize rights that were 
acquired under EU law in another Member State should not only extend to citizens who 
return to their home Member State, but also to citizens who move between two Member 
States of which they are not a national. For them the same principle applies. Rights 
acquired on the basis of EU law through the exercise of free movement rights should be 
retained, also when they are brought with to another Member State of which the benefi-
ciary is not a national.
 176 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 February 1979, case 120/ 78, Cassis de Dijon, para. 14.
 177 Article 4(3) teu. The possiblity to preserve acquired rights is also interesting from the 
perspective of the international law doctrine of ‘acquired rights’, which provides that 
rights obtained on the basis of a Treaty cannot be taken away. See Sik, K.  (1977). The 
Concept of Acquired Rights in International Law:  A Survey. Netherlands International 
Law Review 24 (1– 2), pp.  120– 142; For the application in a Brexit context see Cambien, 
N.  (2018). Residence Rights for EU Citizens and Their Family Members: Navigating the 
New Normal. European Papers 3 (3), pp. 1333– 1352. Cambien also explains that the appli-
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or to preserve the national identity of a Member State that is protected by Ar-
ticle 4(2) teu, but the Court of Justice rejected their arguments. It considered 
thereto that its decision in Coman does not oblige Member States to provide 
the institution of marriage between two persons of the same sex in its national 
law. It only requires the recognition of these marriages for the sole purpose of 
enabling such persons to exercise the rights they enjoy under EU law.178
Indeed, the Court’s judgment is an affluent of long- standing constitution-
al principles, but the application thereof seems not only to perpetuate these 
principles. Through its case- law, the Court may in fact have created a new 
space in EU law. By defining which relationships should be recognized by the 
Member State, even if only for the purpose of maintaining rights that were 
acquired under EU law, a European family law may develop to define which 
relationships are eligible for rights derived from EU law.
Another argument for this thesis can be found in the case of SM. SM con-
cerned an Algerian child which was placed under kafala with a French couple 
who resided in the UK. Kafala is an Islamic institution that resembles foster 
parentship, but it does not create legal descendence. The French couple ap-
plied for family reunification with the Algerian child under EU free move-
ment law, but this was refused, because the UK does not recognize children 
placed under kafala as family member that qualify for family reunification.179 
The Court of Justice did agree that a child placed under kafala cannot be con-
sidered a ‘direct descendant’ within the meaning of Article 2(2c) of Directive 
2004/ 38.180 It can, however, be qualified as ‘other family member’ within the 
meaning of Article 3(2a) of Directive 2004/ 38, whose entrance into the host 
Member State of an EU citizen must be facilitated.181 SM did not concern a 
return situation, but the approach of the Court is similar to its approach in the 
two cases that were discussed above. The Court decided whether and under 
which conditions a family relationship qualifies for family reunification un-
der EU free movement law, regardless of whether national law recognizes that 
relationship or not. Furthermore, if family reunification with the child who is 
placed under kafala is granted in the UK, the reading of Banger and Coman 
 178 Coman, cit., para. 42– 46.
 179 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 March 2019, case C- 129/ 18, SM, para. 23– 30. For an analy-
sis on this case see Strumia, F. (2019). The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling: Variable 
Geometry and Conditional Deference. European Papers 4(1), pp. 389– 393; Den Haese, S., 
and Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). The Emergence of a European Family Law? The ‘Right’ of a 
Child Placed under Kafala Care to Reside within the EU with his Guardian(s). Tijdschrift 
Internationaal Privaatrecht, forthcoming.
 180 SM, cit., para. 49– 56.
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implies that when the couple returns to France, France is held to recognize this 
relationship as well, regardless of their national recognition of children placed 
under kafala under private international law.
Still, the qualification of family relationships that are eligible for family re-
unification under EU free movement law is not arbitrary. The aforegoing chap-
ters elaborated upon the criterion of having created or strengthened family 
life in order to retain a residence right that was obtained in the host Member 
State upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen. It was observed 
that the use of this criterion is coherent with the objectives of free movement 
law, which provides for family reunification rights to facilitate movement of 
EU citizens between Member States. It follows from the more recent case- law 
that the scope of family members who could potentially benefit from family 
reunification under EU law in a return situation and in general, is also con-
nected to the existence of family life. Whereas in O. and B., Altiner and Ravn, 
and Banger, the Court mentioned the existence of family life in abstracto as a 
criterion for family members of EU citizens to qualify for a residence right in 
a return situation, in Coman and SM, the Court made reference to the ECtHR. 
It reiterated that the free movement provisions should be interpreted in the 
light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe-
an Union, which protect family life and the interest of the child. Pursuant to 
Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
rights in the Charter that correspond to rights in the European Convention of 
Human Rights should be interpreted accordingly and minimally offer the same 
protection. Furthermore, the Court reasons, the protection of Article 8 echr 
also extends to same- sex relationships and children placed under kafala. Thus, 
if Article 7 Charter should be interpreted accordingly, then same- sex relation-
ships and children placed under kafala should enjoy protection under EU law 
as well.182 The only difference between the echr and the EU regime, is that the 
existence of family life under the echr does not create an entitlement to fam-
ily reunification, whereas the recent case- law of the Court of Justice indicates 
that EU law does create such an entitlement.183
 182 For same- sex relationships: Coman, cit., para. 48– 51; European Court of Human Rights, 
judgment of 7 November 2013, no.  29381/ 09 and 32684/ 09, Vallianatos and Others 
v. Greece, para. 73; judgment of 14 December 2017, no. 26431/ 12, 26742/ 12, 44057/ 12, and 
60088/ 12, Orlandi and Others v.  Italy, para. 143. For kafala:  SM, cit., para. 66; European 
Court of Human Rights, judgment of 4 October 2012, no.  43631/ 09, Harroudj v.  France, 
para. 40– 41; judgment of 16 December 2014, no.  52265/ 10, Chbihi Loudoudi and Others 
v. Belgium, para. 88– 89.
 183 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/ 80, 9473/ 81 and 
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If Coman and SM indeed predict an understanding of EU law in which the 
existence of family life within the meaning of Article 8 echr is sufficient to be-
come eligible for family reunification rights when free movement rights are re-
lied upon, its potential scope is not necessarily limited to blood relationships. 
It is perceivable that family life exists with a non- family member, for instance 
when two friends live together and run a household together and support each 
other in the same way a family would. If the development in Coman and SM is 
drawn further upon, such a situation may qualify for family reunification un-
der EU law as well, including after the exercise of free movement rights upon 
return to the home Member State of the EU citizen.184 This approach ‘relies, 
for these purposes, on a flexible, pragmatic idea of family that leaves potential 
room to several models of cohabitation and reciprocal responsibility, and to a 
variety of underlying bonds, from the biological, to the legal, to the factual and 
affective.’185 Time will tell if EU law indeed develops in that direction or not.186
x Concluding Remarks
The beginning of this contribution problematized the tension between the 
principle of equality and the division of competences in the EU. Equality is an 
ideal to strive for that is anchored in the EU Treaties but is contrasted with the 
preservation of Member States’ sovereignty. This tension is particularly preva-
lent in family reunification. The EU is competent to regulate family reunifica-
tion for EU citizens who make use of their free movement rights, while those 
January 2006, no. 50435/ 99, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, para. 39; 
judgment of 3 October 2014, no. 12738/ 10, Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, para. 107; Kroeze, 
H.H.C. (2019). The Substance of Rights, cit., p. 253 et seq.
 184 Strumia, F.  (2019). The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling:  Variable Geometry and 
Conditional Deference, cit., p.  390– 391; Kroeze, H.H.C. (2019). De zin van het gezins-
leven:  gezinshereniging op grond van een “duurzame relatie” en de implicaties van 
rechtsmisbruik. Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht 3, pp. 258– 266.
 185 Strumia, F.  (2019). The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling:  Variable Geometry and 
Conditional Deference, cit., p. 392.
 186 If so, it would mirror the development of family reunification rights derived from Article 
20 tfeu. Family reunification on the basis of this provision is granted on the basis of 
dependency between an EU citizen and his family member, but case- law shows that this 
does not need to be a family member that is bloodrelated. In theory, all relationships of 
dependency are potentially eligible for family reunification on these grounds. See Court 
of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2012, joined cases C- 356/ 11 and C- 357/ 11, O.S. and L.; 
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who do not use their free movement rights fall under the competence of the 
Member States. Member States often impose stricter requirements for fami-
ly reunification than the EU, whereby they reversely discriminate their own 
nationals, insofar as they did not use free movement rights. The existence of 
reverse discrimination is counter intuitive and if the EU and its Member States 
do not take up the responsibility to remedy this inequality it may seriously 
undermine the EU’s legitimacy. In the meantime, however, this contribution 
explored another partial remedy to reverse discrimination within the consti-
tutional limits of the EU.
In its case- law, the Court of Justice decided that residence rights for a fam-
ily member of an EU citizen, who made use of free movement rights, can be 
retained after return to the home Member State of the EU citizen, provided 
that the exercise of those rights was effective and genuine. This means that an 
EU citizen can circumvent national family reunification law by temporarily 
moving to another Member State and then return with residence rights for 
his family member. This possibility empowers EU citizens who face reverse 
discrimination to escape from it. It remains a liability that only EU citizens 
who are already empowered can benefit from this route which requires fi-
nancial investment and knowledgeability, but it is a partial solution to re-
verse discrimination which stays within the constitutional limits of EU law. 
Member States may want to act against circumvention of their national laws. 
Therefore, they have the possibility to classify circumvention of national law 
as an abuse of rights, which legitimizes the refusal or withdrawal of residence 
rights. The downside thereof is that reliance on abuse of law undermines le-
gal certainty and the certainty for families about whether or not they are able 
to live with their loved ones. For these reasons, the definition of the scope 
of abuse of law is very important. A broad scope of abuse of law gives way 
to frequent intervention by the Member States to protect themselves from 
circumvention of their national law. A narrow scope of abuse of law limits 
the scope of application by the Member States and offers more legal certain-
ty and protection of citizens’ rights. In the case- law of the Court, a move-
ment can be observed, from a broad essential purpose construction of abuse 
of law, towards a narrower sole purpose construction of abuse of law. The 
shift in the general abuse of law doctrine is especially strong in the field of 
family reunification, where reliance on abuse of law is almost fully rejected 
and reduced to a merely theoretical legal principle. The crucial criterion for a 
legitimate use of EU law that was formulated in cases such as Akrich, O. and 
B., and Coman is that use of EU rights is effective and genuine. More con-
cretely, to retain residence rights upon return to the home Member State of 
the EU citizen, residence in the host Member State must be such as to have 
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created or strengthened family life. Following the Court’s decision in O. and 
B. and Altiner and Ravn, a new interpretation of this criterion was suggested. 
It was proposed to adopt a presumption of having created or strengthened 
family life when residence in the host Member State had a duration of more 
than three months in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 2004/ 38, rather than 
making the three months a fixed condition to retain a residence right. Periods 
of residence less than three months, in accordance with Art. 7 of Directive 
2004/ 38, would then not automatically lead to the refusal of a residence right 
in the home Member State upon return but require additional evidence of 
having created or strengthened family life.
The focus on genuine use of EU law and the impact of the movement on 
family life is quite understandable. Considering the importance the Court at-
taches to the principle of effectiveness in EU law, it is unsurprising that it does 
not easily allow for derogation by the Member States through invoking abuse 
of law. In addition, it is in line with the increasing role of fundamental rights 
protection, provided by the echr and by the Charter, in the EU legal order 
that protection of the family is prioritized over protecting the enforcement of 
national migration law. That may also be the reason why the Court, first, shift-
ed towards the sole purpose doctrine in the context of free movement rights, 
several years before it did so in other fields of EU law.
Although the protection of the family by EU law is commended, construct-
ing the scope of abuse of law too narrowly could also backfire. The decisions of 
the Court in its most recent case- law could suggest that there is no more place 
for abuse of law, and noncompliance with the conditions to retain residence 
rights upon return to the home Member State of the EU citizen simply results 
in non- applicability of EU law. That interpretation would, however, reduce a 
return situation in which the requirement of genuine residence is not fulfilled 
to a purely internal situation, without any protection provided by EU law. In 
that case, protection by the echr might offer solace, but this protection is less 
extensive than the protection by EU law. Classifying non- compliance with the 
conditions for reliance on EU law in a return situation as abuse of rights, on the 
other hand, brings the situation within the scope of EU law and requires that 
procedural safeguards provided by the directive are observed. Thus, arguably, 
a narrow construction of abuse of law benefits EU citizens and their family 
members, because it provides certainty about their rights and future, but when 
the requirements for a right are not fulfilled they are better off when it is qual-
ified as abuse than when EU law is considered not to be applicable. This is also 
a better solution in the light of of reconciling the principle of equality and the 
principle of the division of competences in EU law. To protect the competence 
of the Member States, more cases could be qualified as abuse, but once people 
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fall within the scope of EU law the safeguards against deprivation of the rights 
they obtained are equal for everyone .
The final part of this contribution concerned the definition of family mem-
bers that are eligible for family reunification under EU free movement law 
and in return situations. Traditionally these are the family members defined 
in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/ 38, but differentiation in definitions among 
the Member States still causes uncertainty about which family members of 
EU citizens may derive a residence right from EU law. It was shown that recent 
case- law could remedy this uncertainty through the development of a type of 
European family law, which defines which family members should qualify for 
family reunification on the basis of Article 2(2) or 3(2) of Directive 2004/ 38. 
Although Member States remain competent in principle to define the catego-
ries of family members that are mentioned in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/ 38, 
they are also in principle obliged to recognize derived residence rights that are 
obtained in other Member States in accordance with the law and definition of 
the family of those Member States. This was the case in Banger and Coman, in 
which a residence right for the partner with whom the EU citizen maintained 
a durable relationship, and a residence right for the partner of the same sex as 
the EU citizen had to be recognized, even though the Member States in those 
cases did not themselves grant these rights to those categories of family mem-
bers. The same happened in the case of SM, in which the Court considered that 
a child placed under kafala should be eligible for family reunification with his 
legal guardians under Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/ 38, regardless of the na-
tional recognition of kafala guardianship. This development impacts the com-
petence of the Member State in family law and private international law, but it 
does provide more legal certainty and the Court is wary to limit the impact of 
its decisions to the EU sphere.
The main purpose of this contribution was to further understand the con-
ditions under which EU law can be legally used for family reunification, even 
if national immigration law is circumvented. It was demonstrated that the cre-
ation, strengthening and continuation of family life is central to this exercise, 
which is welcomed from a perspective of legal certainty, and from a human 
rights angle.
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